

# Inspector General

United States  
Department *of* Defense



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# Inspector General

## United States Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

November 17, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES-IRAQ  
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR ADVISING AND  
TRAINING, UNITED STATES FORCES-IRAQ  
DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS (J-4), UNITED STATES FORCES-IRAQ  
COMMANDER, ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces (Report No. SPO-2011-001)

We are providing this final report for review and comment. This is the ninth in a series of reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations Directorate that focus on the train and equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.


We request additional comments and information by December 17, 2010 as follows:

- Commander, United States Forces-Iraq: We request additional information as stated in Recommendations 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 3., 4.a., 4.b., 7., 10., and 14.
- Deputy Commanding General, Advise & Train, United States Forces-Iraq: Recommendations 2.a., 6.b., 8, 9.a., 9.b., 11.a., 12.a., 12.b., 13., 15.b., 16., 17.a., 17.b., 18., 20., 21., 22.a., and 22.b.
- J4, United States Forces-Iraq: Recommendations 6.a., 15.a.(1)., and 15.a.(2).
- Commander, U.S. Army Material Command: We request your comments to Recommendations 6.c. and 11.b.

If possible, please send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [spo@dodig.mil](mailto:spo@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the

place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Stanley E. Meyer (703) 604-9130 (DSN 312-664-9130) or [Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "K P Moorefield". The signature is stylized with a large, looped "K" and "P" at the beginning, followed by "Moore" and "Field" in a cursive script.

Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations



# **Executive Summary – Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces**

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## **Who Should Read This Report?**

Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its subordinate commands in Iraq, the Military Departments, and Agencies responsible for and engaged in training, mentoring, equipping, and other aspects of the logistics capability development of the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) should read this report.

## **Synopsis**

Developing an effective logistical capability that supports the enduring security operations of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) by the time the U.S. forces withdraw at the end of 2011 is a key goal of the Commander, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I). Considerable progress has been made since SPO's previous report that addressed this requirement, issued on December 19, 2008. Nonetheless, there remains a significant gap between the Minimum Essential Capabilities our command in Iraq has defined as constituting the crucial foundation of a sustainable ISF logistical system and its current capability.

To close this capability shortfall in the relatively brief time remaining to USF-I will require an intensified effort that would appear to be beyond our on-the-ground forces' resource capability. Additional subject matter expertise support from DOD and its supporting logistics organizations probably will be required to accomplish the mission with respect to building ISF logistical capacity. This requirement could be accentuated if DOD does not receive the additional Iraq Security Forces Funds requested for FY 10 and FY 11, fiscal resources identified in a previous SPO report as important to USF-I in order for it to provide the required training, mentoring and equipping assistance.

Not accomplishing the mission could have significant consequences with respect to ISF ability to provide for Iraq's internal and external defense. It would also result in the inability to sustain the substantial investment made by the international community, primarily the United States, in infrastructure, equipment, and munitions necessary to establish an indigenous and independent Iraqi security capability.

## **Specific Results**

The report is divided into four parts: (1) Notable Improvements; (2) Iraq Security Forces; (3) Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the MoD Joint Headquarters, and army; and (4) Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Iraqi police forces.

## ***Notable Improvements***

We selected eight examples of notable progress in the development of ISF logistics capability at the strategic and operational levels, including:

- Establishment of a USF-I ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate by the Commanding General (USF-I).
- Initial development of a plan to meet MEC for ISF logistics by December 2011. (MEC is defined as the logistics and industrial capability that can attain and sustain minimum materiel readiness levels for the ISF.)
- An increased understanding of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales process, and an increased willingness by senior MoD and MoI leaders to use it.
- Significant progress in the development of functional ministerial-level processes in the MoI over the past two years.
- The leadership and vision provided by a few key senior officers in the MoI and the MoD Joint Headquarters of the Iraqi military that continues to have a positive impact on improving logistics sustainment capacity of the Iraqi police forces and military services.
- Iraqi investment in human capital development for establishing an enduring logistics capability in the military services and police forces.
- Tentative acceptance and use by the Iraqi Army of the Iraqi Asset Management Program, a software package similar to the U.S. Army's unit-level logistics system for managing and ordering replacement parts.
- Improvements in warehousing and supply accountability procedures at the MoI.

Although these and other focus areas require continued careful attention and support in the future and much work remains to be done, the USF-I advisors and trainers, military and police training teams and mentors, and the U.S. Advise and Assist Brigades merit recognition for the significant progress made to date conducting an extremely complex and difficult mission.

## ***Challenges—Areas of Concern***

### **Management Letter**

The assessment team released a management letter to DOD that preceded the official release of this report. Its focus was the role of the fiscal request made by DOD in its FY 10 Supplemental and FY 11 budget requests with respect to the Iraq Security Support Fund (ISFF). Our assessment determined that the funds requested will have a critical role in enabling our forces in Iraq to accomplish their mission of ensuring that the ISF are capable of providing for their own long term logistical sustainment. (The management letter is located in Appendix F of this report.)

**Limited Time and Other Resources.** With less than 16 months remaining until the USF-I end-of-mission in Iraq, a concerted and expedited effort must be made to ensure the development of a MEC for critical ISF combat-enabling forces and processes, to

include the development of an enduring ISF logistics system. That effort requires sufficient funding of the ISFF and staffing of USF-I mentors/trainers and staff officers to aggressively pursue the building of a logistics system foundation that will ensure the long-term operational effectiveness of the Iraqi military and police forces.

### **Organizational Processes at the Ministerial Level and Within the ISF.**

The planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes at the MoD are generally dysfunctional. The ministry cannot currently provide effective logistics and maintenance support to the Iraqi military because it lacks the ability to plan, accurately generate requirements, justify its budget, and execute its funding efficiently and effectively. (This is less of an issue within MoI, although it also has systemic shortcomings.)

Throughout the military services and police organizations, weaknesses in the logistics process included spare parts inventory management; use of the national logistics depot workshops to conduct 4<sup>th</sup> line maintenance; supplying critical repair parts to the army field commands; and the use of the Iraqi Army Regional Location Commands for consolidated maintenance, in accordance with Iraqi doctrine.

Corrective action for issues involving dysfunctional ISF processes must start at the Ministerial level. USF-I requires additional planning, programming, budgeting, and execution expertise and assistance from DOD.

### **Developing an Enduring ISF Sustainment Capability**

Developing a logistics sustainment capability within the ISF is critical to the success of the U.S. Government mission in Iraq. The Government of Iraq (GoI) and USF-I have made major progress in the development of ISF combat capability, but the ability of the ISF to sustain logistics readiness remains at risk. The ISF has not yet achieved MEC in areas of logistics sustainment and may not achieve that capability by December 2011, which is the end-of-mission for U.S. forces in Iraq.

Some initiatives under development that will help ensure the GoI remains focused on building logistics sustainment within its security forces up through and beyond December 2011 are:

- Completion and approval of a written, comprehensive, and integrated USF-I plan for developing the logistics capability of the ISF that is coordinated with the GoI;
- Professional logistics training for senior Iraqi leaders at the Iraqi International Academy/Iraqi Strategic Center of Excellence; and
- A robust logistics cell within the Office of Security Cooperation, the security assistance organization within the U.S. Embassy Baghdad that will endure after December 2011.

**Oversight Responsibility for Equipment and Materiel Transferred to the ISF.** USF-I has an oversight responsibility for U.S.-funded equipment and materiel provided to the ISF, as defined in U.S. law and DOD policy. The ability to meet this requirement becomes increasingly difficult as the drawdown of trainers/mentors continues.



Furthermore, the extent of the DOD oversight requirement and the capability to execute it after end-of-mission in December 2011 is not clear. Because of the long lead times for receiving certain equipment, shipping and distribution of U.S.-funded equipment to the ISF can be expected well into 2012 and beyond. A formal policy should be implemented to ensure the presence of U.S. personnel to provide oversight of U.S.-supplied equipment through December 2011 and beyond, in order to meet the requirements set forth in U.S. law and DOD policy.

**Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement.** The DOD did not have an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in place with the MoD to facilitate any logistics assistance required by the GoI after end-of-mission. With an ACSA, DOD can authorize its Components to acquire, and in some cases to provide logistics support, to include supplies and services directly from or to eligible countries and international organizations. USCENTCOM is coordinating with USF-I to develop an ACSA that will be proposed to the next GOI, if appropriate.

## Recommendations Table

Client	Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment/Information	No Additional Comments Required
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,		5.a.
Commander, United States Forces-Iraq	1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 3., 4.a., 4.b., 7., 10., and 14.	
Deputy Commanding General, Advise & Train, United States Forces-Iraq	2.a., 6.b., 8, 9.a., 9.b., 11.a., 12.a., 12.b., 13., 15.b., 16., 17.a., 17.b., 18., 20., 21., 22.a., and 22.b.	2.b, 5.b.(1), 5.b.(2), 9.c., and 19.
J4, United States Forces-Iraq	6.a., 15.a.(1), and 15.a.(2).	15.a.(3).
Commander, U.S. Army Material Command	6.c. and 11.b.	

**Please provide comments by December 17, 2010.**

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# Introduction

## Background

This is the ninth in a series of reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operation Directorate that focus on the train and equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. General areas discussed in these reports include:

- Accountability of weapons transferred to the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- Accountability of night vision devices transferred to the Iraq Security Forces,
- Effectiveness/responsiveness of the Foreign Military Sales system in support of the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- Logistics development of the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- Effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces, and
- Review of the Coalition Support Fund Program and other DoD security assistance/cooperation programs with Pakistan.

Previous reports on these subjects may be viewed at <http://www.dodig.mil/spo/reports.html>.

## Public Laws

Congress appropriated \$18.2 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and \$25.5 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund in Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, 111-32, and 111-118. These Public Laws define the “train and equip” mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specify that the funds be used in support of the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

## Objectives

On February 19, 2010, the DODIG announced the “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces,” (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0286.000). The objectives of this assessment were to determine whether:

- The planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainability capability for the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) were effective.
- Plans, training, preparations, and designated missions of United States Forces–Iraq (USF-I) Advising and Training (A&T), the U.S. advisory and assistance brigades, and sustainment brigades to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the ISF were synchronized with in-country plans and operational assumptions and needs.





# Part I – Notable Improvements

## Introduction

We found that USF-I A&T (formerly Multi-National Security Training Command-Iraq) had made significant progress in developing the logistics sustainment capacity of the ISF when compared to the logistics sustainment development of the ISF as assessed during DODIG Special Plans and Operations visits in September/October 2007 and April 2008.

## Strategic Initiatives

### ***Strategic Logistics Assessment***

Responding to a recommendation from the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) "Strategic Logistics Assessment Team – Iraq Report", dated September 2009, to put a qualified member of the DOD Senior Executive Service (SES) in charge of developing ISF strategic logistics capability, the Commanding General, USF-I, brought an SES on board from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) in mid-January 2010 to lead an assessment of the ISF logistics capability and to develop a plan to meet minimum essential capabilities (MECs) for logistics by December 2011. The plan identifies three high value sustainment initiatives (HVSIs) to be used as hands-on case studies to mentor appropriate Iraqi personnel in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) in developing requirements, budgeting, contracting, and executing a Ministerial-level logistics sustainment program for a modern army and police force.<sup>1</sup> The HVSIs are:

- High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) maintenance/repair parts requirements (Army),
- Contract logistics support transition strategy (Air Force), and
- Ship maintenance requirements (Navy).

The execution of these HVSIs as a training/mentoring strategy is enabled by ongoing projects designed to expand the effect of logistics/maintenance success with the HVSIs, which include:

- Information technology infrastructure, training, and development,
- Professional logistics training,
- Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution training, and development,
- National warehouse build-out and stocking, and
- Developing ministerial capacity to govern.

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<sup>1</sup> HVSIs focus synchronized energy and resources intended to influence multiple levels and elements of the logistics and fiscal processes in order to achieve key strategic outcomes and broad, enduring effects. Source: ISF Logistics Path Forward: Creating Enduring Capability IPR Brief, 10 MAY 2010.

## ***Key Leader Engagements***

Key Leader Engagements are also to be conducted between senior U.S. mentors/advisors and appropriate ministerial personnel involved in the logistics sustainment process, including the Ministers, by their U.S. counterparts from USF-I and A&T. If properly resourced and executed, this plan represents a visionary approach to a difficult issue, offering a best-case solution for developing a minimum essential strategic-level ISF logistics capability by December 2011.

## ***Foreign Military Sales***

Personnel in MoD and MoI have shown an increased understanding of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, as well as an increased willingness to use it. There are currently 195 active FMS cases, all using Iraqi money, representing a significant increase over active cases two years ago. This progress results from the continuous mentoring and advising effort of MNSTC-I and A&T personnel in the Security Assistance Office/Iraq Security Assistance Mission over several years, as well as increased responsiveness of the FMS system. Case processing time has gone from the standard 120 days to approximately 45 days for Iraq. Additionally, repair parts are often delivered within 60 days of Letter of Authorization signature. This success was largely due to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) setting up a Case Writing Division, where all the necessary players in CONUS are in one place. (The exception is that long lead time procurement items, such as the C-130J airplane, are excluded from this statistic.) Additionally, personnel in the Iraqi Logistics Operations Center have received the appropriate training from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management on the FMS process, enabling them access to the DSCA Security Cooperation Information Portal, which is used to track the status of FMS cases.

## ***Progress within Ministry of Interior***

The MoI has made significant progress in the last two years in the development of functional ministerial-level processes. Although MoI processes and procedures may still need some work from the U.S. perspective, they are sufficient from the Iraqi perspective, allowing the Minister and his Directors to function and adequately discharge their duties. With mentoring from A&T personnel, MoI has steadily increased its budget execution rate over time, increasing from 84.5 percent in CY 2007 to 90.6 percent in CY 2009. It has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to provide ministerial-level logistics support through effective contracting. In the areas of policy and planning, the MoI has developed and published:

- A Strategic Plan,
- A National Maintenance Plan,
- An Annual Operating Plan, and
- A three-year Budget Plan.

The leadership and vision provided by a few key senior officers in MoI and the MoD Joint Headquarters of the Iraqi Army (IA) continues to have a telling effect on the logistics and sustainment capacity of the Iraqi police forces and Army, such as:

- The accountability of weapons and ammunition in both the Army and police has significantly improved in the past three years.
- The progress noted above within MoI in the areas of logistics sustainment and warehouse management is largely due to the current minister and his Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure.
- Senior Iraqi officials involved in the logistics sustainment process acknowledge that MoD and JHQ processes for requirements generation and the ability to execute via effective contracting are falling short of the mark. They acknowledge the difficulty of fixing them and understand that these failures are preventing development of an effective national-level logistics sustainment capability for the Iraqi military.

### ***Investment in Human Capital***

With the assistance of USF-I A&T, the Iraqi Air Force, Navy, and Army have made an investment in human capital that will help to establish an enduring logistics capability in those Services.

- 45 courses are being taught by qualified Iraqi instructors at the Iraqi Air Force Technical School that are focused on basic aircraft maintenance and other technical issues.
- All Air Force contractor logistics support contracts ensure that contractors will teach/train Iraqis on the equipment and techniques used. The goal is for the Iraqis to learn how to do the job themselves and reduce the reliance on contractor logistics support.
- The Iraqi Navy will receive 15 new U.S.-built patrol boats and will send the crews for training in the U.S. The courses will be held in the same location where the ships are being built and will include classroom and simulator instruction, and eventually training at sea.
- The Electrical and Mechanical Engineering School at Taji National Depot (Taji) trains personnel in maintenance-related specialties. Taught by qualified Iraqi instructors, the school has trained 1,970 students since June 2008. Refurbished eight months ago, the school has adequate training equipment and training aides. It currently has 795 students enrolled, including 641 “rejoiners” from the “old Iraqi Army” that have a high school education and a background in Electrical and Mechanical Engineering.
- The Administrative Affairs School at Taji began training personnel in December 2009. It currently has 54 courses scheduled for 2010 in the areas of Supply and Warehouse Management, Ammunition Inspection, Field Kitchens, Dining Facility Management, Cooks, and Barbers. The school currently has about 650 students enrolled, including 120 officers and 240 non-commissioned officers. It also has over 100 officer and non-commissioned officer rejoiners.

## **Operational Initiatives**

### ***Iraqi Asset Management Program***

The IA has tentatively begun to use the Iraqi Asset Management Program (IAMP). This software package, similar to the U.S. Army's unit-level logistics system for managing and ordering replacement parts, was used by a contractor, ANHAM, when it managed the Medium Workshops for the IA. IAMP essentially provides an internet-based link between Taji (4<sup>th</sup> Line Maintenance) and the Medium Workshops (3<sup>rd</sup> Line Maintenance). The Field Workshops (2<sup>nd</sup> Line Maintenance) provide data to the Medium Workshops via compact disk. When the ANHAM contract finished and the Iraqis decided to manage the Medium Workshops themselves, ANHAM left the IAMP program behind. Like all software systems, it is only as accurate as the information entered into it. The contract for the IAMP expires in January 2011 and it is uncertain if the Iraqis will renew it, although it is the only automation that the Iraqis currently have in their maintenance management system.

### ***Ministry of Interior Warehousing***

MoI warehousing and materiel accountability procedures continue to improve. The logistics operation at the Baghdad Police College has moved markedly forward. Plans have also been finalized for the transfer of the Abu Ghraib warehouse complex from U.S. control to MoI control. An inventory is underway and the transfer was scheduled to take place by August 2010. The plan called for the transfer of most materiel stored at Baghdad Police College to Abu Ghraib, with Baghdad Police College retaining a capability as a Central Issue Facility for police personnel going through training there.

### ***Numaniyah***

The Medium Workshop at Numaniyah initiated a direct exchange program for HMMWV starters and brakes. It was popular with supported units, because they immediately received a serviceable part for the turn-in of an unserviceable part, which was a-typical within the IA maintenance system.

## **Part II – Iraq Security Forces**

### **Introduction**

This section contains a series of observations and recommendations for improvement that apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to the entire ISF, including the MoD and Iraqi military and the MoI and Iraqi police. For purposes of this assessment, the ISF consists of the MoD, the military JHQ, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the MoI, the Federal Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, the Port of Entry Police, and the Iraq Police Service.





## **Observation 1. Time and Personnel Resource Constraints Will Limit Advise and Train Efforts to Develop ISF Logistics Capability**

The USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG A&T) has shifted primary “train and equip” mission focus from ISF force generation to developing force sustainment capacity, including logistics capability. However, USF-I has limited time in which to improve the ISF logistics system through training, mentoring, and equipping between now and December 31, 2011, the USF-I end-of-mission in Iraq.

The number of assigned A&T personnel has already diminished in line with the USF-I objective of reducing its force size to 50,000 by the end of August 2010. Additionally, the six remaining Advise and Assist Brigades, which also have a key role in ISF logistics capability building as partners to the IA, will progressively withdraw in order to meet the mandate for total withdrawal of U.S. military forces by December 31, 2011.

The constraints of time and personnel could result in the inability of U.S. forces to accomplish the goal of developing an enduring MEC for ISF logistics functions prior to end-of-mission.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” September 29, 2006.** This document sets forth planning policies, processes, and procedures to govern the joint operation planning and execution activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders in developing selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides guidance on preparing appropriate plans. Enclosure R describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing a Request for Forces or Request for Capabilities message.

### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations and will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, missions, and lessons learned aid in the development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

### ***ISF Logistics Sustainment Mentors/Trainers***

The initial emphasis on building basic army and police forces did not include parallel development of ISF logistics sustainment capacity, which currently lags military and police operational support requirements. U.S. forces have limited time left in which to complete the development of the minimum logistics capability A&T has defined as essential to ensure viability of the ISF over the long-term. However, the number of personnel assigned to the A&T command has been reduced as part of the overall

responsible drawdown to 50,000 U.S. forces, achieved at the end of August 2010. There are indications that the USF-I reduction of personnel could reduce A&T's timely ability to develop key ISF logistics functions. A&T needs sufficient military trainers/advisors to develop an enduring Iraqi logistics sustainment capability.

The assessment team received repeated reports that A&T's ongoing drawdown was having or would have a negative effect on development of force sustainment in terms of developing ISF logistics capability.

- The current U.S. Logistics Military Advisory Team (LMAT) supporting the nascent Federal Police Sustainment Brigade will depart during the summer of 2010, with no apparent plans to replace it. The Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Commander, the Federal Police Deputy Commander, the Commander of the Iraq Training Assistance Mission-Police (ITAM-Police), and the LMAT members expressed concern over the negative impact of this loss of mentoring/ training capability at such a critical period of Federal Police logistics development.
- DLA personnel supporting the mentoring and training at Taji are scheduled to depart between August and September 2010, with no apparent backfill, despite the backlog of approximately 500 storage connexes of un-inventoried repair parts, with more arriving daily. Many of those repair parts were purchased with U.S. Iraq Security Forces Fund money, requiring U.S. Government oversight to ensure the funding is accounted for and the purpose of the expenditure is accomplished. Additionally, major warehouse construction at Taji is nearing completion, offering an opportunity to further mentor the Iraqis on effective management of warehousing at the national depot-level.
- Institutional business processes at the MoD, and less so at MoI, were insufficient to provide sustainable logistics support to the Iraqi Army and police. Those shortcomings existed specifically in the areas of requirements generation for logistics support, budgeting for that support, and execution through contracting. Although A&T was developing a strategic-level plan to address those issues at the ministerial level, it could lack the requisite on-the-ground expertise necessary to train or mentor the appropriate personnel in the Iraqi ministries. Because the length of time available to A&T mentors cannot be increased, having the appropriate personnel on the ground is critical to mission accomplishment. The Iraqi Commanders of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering School and the Administrative Affairs Schools at Taji both expressed concern about the pending loss of U.S. trainers. Both of those schools are key enablers for building an enduring logistics sustainment capability within ISF.

The following chart gives an example of the magnitude of the A&T drawdown of U.S. mentors/trainers supporting the Iraqi Army at the training centers and logistics depots.

	SEP 2009	APR 2010	AUG 2010
Institutional School Advisors	33	33	31
Iraq Training Assistance Mission-Army HQ	77	70	64
Training Centers/LMAT	179	179	68
Contractors	198	97	66
Linguists	172	123	71
<b>Total</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>300</b>

**Table 1: Iraq Training Assistance Mission-Army Drawdown**      **Source: USF-I A&T**

From September 2009 to August 2010, the Iraq Training Assistance Mission-Army (ITAM-Army) will have lost 359 positions (54 percent). Most notable, the training centers and LMATs will have lost 111 personnel, an approximate 62 percent reduction in an area important to development of the Army's essential logistics capability.

The overall personnel strength in the Iraqi police training program was 643 in February 2010 and is projected to be at 356 by June 2011, with an end of DOD mission transfer to the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which projects its strength to be 350. However, the ITAM-Police portion of the Iraqi police training program will transition from about 43 in February 2010 to 10 by first quarter FY11. This is particularly disconcerting as ITAM-Police has responsibility for mentoring/training at the ministerial level, where many of the issues with logistics business processes and policy reside. Furthermore, the recommended Iraqi Police advisor team structures for the Civilian Police training team and the Directorate of Border Enforcement team, as presented in the ITAM-Police Personnel Drawdown Brief dated February 12, 2010, do not include logistics subject matter experts.

In the overall transition from MNSTC-I to the current A&T organization, U.S. assigned strength has dropped significantly. Although presumably in proportion to the drawdown of U.S. combat forces, it could have a detrimental impact on A&T training and mentoring capacity. A&T needs to maintain sufficient U.S. trainer/mentor strength through 2011, particularly in those areas associated with developing key enablers, such as logistics, if it hopes to succeed in its mission of building the minimum essential capabilities of an enduring logistics system.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

1. Through United States Forces-Iraq's end of mission in December 2011, Commander, United States Forces-Iraq:

a. Direct the execution of an aggressive plan to ensure that the Iraq Security Forces achieve minimum essential capability in logistics by December 2011.

b. In coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, continue to source trainers/mentors at current levels at the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters, Taji National Depot, logistics schools, Federal Police Headquarters and Sustainment Brigade, General Districts of Police, and Border Police Regional Maintenance facilities.

c. In coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, modify the structure of the training/advising teams for the Civilian Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and the Iraqi Police to include logistics and administrative subject matter experts.

d. Request that specialized personnel resources, or "tiger teams," be mobilized from CONUS forces in order to reinforce planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes that support logistics system development at both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that Commander, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the plan developed to ensure the ISF's achievement of minimum essential capability in logistics. Additionally, please identify any steps that have been or will be taken to source mentors/trainers at current levels, modify the structure of MoI training/advising teams and to address the mobilization of "tiger teams" to reinforce PPBE processes at the MoD and MoI.



## **Observation 2. Building An Enduring Logistics Capability within the ISF Requires Planning and Training Beyond December 2011**

The ISF likely will not attain full logistics sustainment capability by December 2011, particularly in planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes and systems, and will require continued training efforts beyond the USF-I end of mission.

That shortfall in ISF logistics capability development occurred because the more pressing need to generate ISF combat forces over the past several years precluded the generation and development of enabling forces and capabilities, including that of a logistics sustainment capability. Additionally, the looming deadline of December 2011 allows little time to develop a viable logistics and industrial capability that can attain and sustain minimum materiel readiness levels for the ISF.

Failure to develop an ISF logistics capability that will endure beyond the USF-I end of mission in December 2011 could result in a downward spiral of operational readiness that would put Iraq's security and stability at risk.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Army Field Manual 3-07, "Stability Operations," October 2008.** This manual is the Army's keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. It presents the overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals.

**Army Field Manual 3-07.1, "Security Force Assistance," May 2009.** This manual is the Army's doctrinal publication for security force assistance. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance, focusing on brigade combat teams conducting security force assistance and advising foreign security forces.

### ***Developing a Sustainment Capability in the Iraq Security Forces***

Developing a logistics sustainment capability within the ISF is critical to the success of the U.S. government's mission in Iraq. The Government of Iraq (GoI) and USF-I have made major progress in development of ISF combat capability, but the ability of the ISF to sustain logistics readiness remains at risk. The ISF has not yet achieved a minimum essential capability in areas of logistics sustainment and may not achieve that capability by December 2011, which is the end of mission for USF-I.

Two initiatives that will help ensure that the GoI remains focused on building logistics sustainment within its security forces up through and beyond December 2011 are:

- Including professional logistics training at the Iraqi International Academy/Iraqi Strategic Center of Excellence.

- Establishing a robust logistics cell within the Office of Security Cooperation; this office will be the security assistance organization in the U.S. Embassy Baghdad that will endure after December 2011.

### ***Professional Logistics Training***

One of the major challenges to building a logistics sustainment capability within the ISF is developing an understanding that sustainment is important to the long-term operational capability of combat organizations and equipment. To date, there has been very little professional logistics education available in Iraq, and only recently had logistics training for officers and enlisted line-maintenance personnel been established at the Joint Base Workshop (JBW) at Taji. The ISF has also had limited specialized logistics training, whereby a few officers were sent for logistics training in the U.S., but ad hoc training does not represent a professional curriculum. Senior USF-I officers suggested expanding current initiatives, such as mobile training teams, train-the-trainer programs, and trips abroad to study logistics. Establishing a professional logistics curriculum within the newly-formed Iraqi International Academy, also referred to as the Iraqi Strategic Center of Excellence, is one way to ensure that logistics remains in the forefront of the GoI training focus.

The Iraqi International Academy was currently in the process of being built and is to be modeled on the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. According to the Director of Strategic Logistics, incorporating logistics training into the Iraqi Strategic Center is an important step in developing an enduring ISF logistics capability and could be initially supported with ISFF. The Director stated that establishing a professional logistics education within the Iraqi International Academy would ensure the development of high-caliber logistics officers for the ISF, which is a critical step in achieving a logistics sustainment capability.

### ***Office of Security Cooperation***

At the time of our visit in April 2010, the Office of Security Cooperation was still in the concept phase, and USF-I staff, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, was in the process of developing notional organizational structures. The USF-I Director of Strategic Logistics stated that the Office of Security Cooperation must have a robust logistics cell in order to ensure that logistics sustainment remained a priority for GoI. The Director also suggested that the notional logistics cell should be directed by a senior-ranking civilian or military officer in order to encourage the GoI and the Ministers of Defense and Interior to collaborate horizontally and vertically and continue to invest in sustainment.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

2. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq:

a. Coordinate with the Government of Iraq to ensure that professional logistics training is incorporated into the program of instruction at the Iraqi International Academy/Iraqi Strategic Center of Excellence and is made available to senior officers in the Iraq Security Forces.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the program of instruction for the Iraqi International Academy/Iraqi Strategic Center of Excellence, once available.

2. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq:

b. Coordinate with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad and U.S. Central Command to ensure a robust logistics cell is established within the Office of Security Cooperation, directed by a senior-ranking civilian or military officer, that prioritizes a program of continued Iraq Security Forces logistics development.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation, stating that support for this recommendation is identified in the USF-I transition plan of programs, projects, activities, and tasks currently being conducted by USF-I. These specific activities will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy – Baghdad and the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq. The members of the logistics section will be fully qualified and tasked with the mission to support the continued development of the ISF's logistical capabilities.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We have reviewed the USF-I transition plan, and note that the Logistics Section in Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq is programmed for 29 personnel, with an SES Chief of Section. We require no additional input from the Command on this issue.



### **Observation 3. Comprehensive Plan for Developing the Logistics Capability of the ISF**

USF-I did not have a comprehensive, integrated plan for developing the ISF logistics system that unified the efforts of U.S. logistics trainers and mentors across the USF-I lines of operation.

This apparently occurred because the necessity of generating Iraqi military and police forces had been the priority focus of U.S. “train and equip” efforts; only recently has USF-I shifted its priority emphasis to ISF logistics system building, and designated staff personnel to prepare a strategic-level, comprehensive, integrated plan to support this effort.

Failure to develop, coordinate, and publish such a plan that unifies the USF-I command elements efforts to develop the logistics capability of the ISF could limit the effectiveness of efforts by U.S. forces in developing the minimum essential capability required across the spectrum of ISF logistics operations prior to departure of U.S. military forces in December 2011.

#### ***Applicable Criteria***

##### **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” September 29, 2006.**

This document sets forth planning policies, processes, and procedures to govern the joint operation planning and execution activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander(s) and other joint force commanders in development of selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Enclosure (R) of the manual describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing an RFF or Request for Capabilities message.

##### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

#### ***The Strategic-Level Comprehensive ISF Logistics Development Plan***

Although considerable progress had been made by U.S. forces in developing ISF logistics capability there were still key functional areas that needed improvement. However, the focus on generating Iraqi combat forces meant a lesser priority was given to developing a logistics capability at the ministerial level, with appropriately functioning business processes, or to ensuring the integration of the various logistics development efforts across the spectrum of ISF organizations. To complete the development of the minimum



essential capability in logistics, the USF-I must launch an aggressive but focused training, mentoring, and equipping campaign to meet this objective.

Responding to a recommendation from the DLA's "Strategic Logistics Assessment Team – Iraq Report", dated September 2009, to put a qualified member of the DOD SES in charge of developing ISF strategic logistics capability, the Commanding General, USF-I, brought a USD (AT&L) SES on board in mid-January 2010 to lead an assessment of the ISF logistics capability and to develop a plan to meet logistics MECs by December 2011.

The ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate developed a draft plan to address logistics business process development at the ministerial and depot levels. That plan provided an incisive and organized approach to developing key logistics capabilities, despite the limited time and resources available to USF-I. After that plan is reviewed and approved by the USF-I Commanding General, it should be institutionalized into a comprehensive written plan or fragmentary order that addresses strategic and operational-level logistics issues within the ISF and integrates the efforts of U.S. logistics trainers, Advise and Assist Brigades, Base Support Battalions, LMATs, the various police organizations, and logistics mentors at the MoD, the JHQ, and the MoI.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

3. Commander, United States Forces-Iraq, in coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq, publish a plan or fragmentary order that integrates the efforts of Advise and Assist Brigades, Sustainment Brigades, and Advising and Training elements to expedite the development of a logistics sustainment capability within the Iraq Security Forces.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that Commander, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the aforementioned plan or fragmentary order.

## **Observation 4. United States Forces-Iraq Metrics and the ISF Readiness Reporting System**

USF-I did not have standardized metrics for clearly determining logistical posture of the ISF. Moreover, it specifically appeared that Iraqi Army commanders and police officials were generally overstating operational readiness capabilities, particularly regarding vehicle and weapons-systems readiness rates. Therefore, neither USF-I nor the Iraqis were applying credible metrics with regard to logistics posture.

This occurred because USF-I did not develop and direct the use of standardized metrics by U.S. mentors/trainers across all units and organizations assigned to USF-I when evaluating ISF logistics/maintenance readiness. The situation was exacerbated by the acceptance of ISF unit-leader assessments of logistics and maintenance readiness reporting through the ISF system, without any validation.

As a result, a common and measureable assessment of logistics sustainment progress across the ISF was inhibited which created a misleading picture of the extent of logistics / maintenance deficiencies and problems. Further, an unreliable system of logistics readiness reports was produced that could not be used to consistently and accurately determine the readiness status of ISF units. Moreover, A&T could not focus timely support on readiness issues and deficiencies that might be systemic and should have been addressed. Likewise, ISF leaders were not able to accurately measure the true logistics and maintenance status of ISF operational units/organizations, which created a false sense of confidence. That false sense of confidence may impede the ability of ISF to focus its support and corrective actions on critical areas and may overstate its ability to respond to security threats.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

#### **Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.**

This document provides transition teams and organizations partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done.

#### **Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ), “DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009.**

Chapter 6 describes the mission and function of the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and the processes and procedures for maintenance in the Iraqi Armed Services. Chapter 8—Iraqi Logistics

Operations Center (ILOC) (DRAFT). The ILOC serves as a Strategic Level Logistics Operations Center at the JHQ/MoD for the collection and distribution of logistics information from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Naval Command and relevant Operational Centers, and provides viable analysis to the JHQ in order to assist the decision-making process.

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the former Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

**American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

**U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” January 2009.** This document examines the theory and principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency, the components of an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and interagency counterinsurgency assessment, planning and implementation. The DOD and U.S. military forces provide a broad range of capabilities to support an integrated U.S. counterinsurgency effort. These may include advising and training foreign military and logistics support.

### ***Logistics and Maintenance Readiness Reporting***

USF-I assessment of ISF operational readiness, to include logistics and maintenance, was captured by using the USF-I Command Assessment Tool. However, that tool did not provide a standardized metric that accurately portrayed current ISF logistics and maintenance readiness posture with sufficient clarity to be useful.

While the ISF did have an internal system of readiness reporting, it was often unreliable because reporting was inflated. U.S. trainers reported that ISF Commanders and personnel knowingly reported higher rates of readiness, even after being questioned about it by their U.S. counterparts. For example, U.S. advisors pointed out instances in which Iraqi army units reported over 90 percent HMMWV operational readiness rates, even when they knew that the accurate rate was between 70 and 75 percent. One senior officer in an Iraqi Army division candidly told us that the actual HMMWV operational readiness rates in his division was closer to 50 percent. There were similar issues with overstated readiness reporting in police organizations, according to U.S. advisors. Despite those issues, U.S. advisors noted that it was relatively rare for Iraqi security units, military or police, to fail to conduct a mission because of vehicle readiness. The maintenance readiness system appeared to be functioning well enough by Iraqi standards to complete missions despite inflation in the reporting of operational readiness rates. However, a system that routinely

accepts inflated operational readiness reporting could well cause the ISF to fail when placed under sufficient, sustained operational stress.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

### **4. Commander, United States Forces-Iraq:**

a. Direct employment of common, measureable criteria for assessing logistics minimum essential capabilities of the Iraq Security Forces, such as that defined in the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training Strategic Assessment, across all U.S. military organizations involved in the train and equip mission.

b. In coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training and Deputy Commanding General for Support, direct that Iraq Security Force logistics and maintenance readiness reporting receives a current and ongoing reality check by U.S. personnel on-the-ground to ensure the Command Assessment Tool accurately reflects the Iraq Security Force readiness posture, and measures the logistics sustainment gap.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that Commander, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the criteria developed for use across all U.S. military organizations involved in the train and equip mission to assess the ISF's logistics minimum essential capabilities and a copy of the directive resulting from Recommendation 4.b.



## **Observation 5. Ministry of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Processes**

The MoD did not meet maintenance and repair parts requirements for non-FMS supported vehicles, weapons, and weapons systems (estimated at 75 to 80 percent of total inventory by value) in 2009 and 2010.

This occurred because MoD had significant systemic problems with planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) processes. Failure to focus on the importance of logistics, and weaknesses in the PPBE processes, particularly a lack of requirements generation and procurement capability, severely hampered efforts by MoD to logistically sustain the readiness of its forces.

As a result, weak PPBE processes and the failure to resource the maintenance and repair parts requirements of MoD forces has contributed to chronic shortages in the field of critically-needed equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, and weapons systems, and negatively impacted MoD mission readiness and its ability to respond to significant security threats.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**United States Forces-Iraq (Advise and Train), Minimum Essential Capabilities Assessment, April 2010.** This document contains the DCG A&T's assessment of current and projected status of certain MECs for the ISF.

### ***Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Processes in the Ministry of Defense***

The MoD did not have a functional PPBE process, particularly in the areas of requirements-driven procurement and acquisition. MoD also did not adequately budget to make sufficient progress towards MEC or have the ability to execute the scarce funds that it did budget.

USF-I A&T advisors indicated that GoI ministries had difficulty assessing their organizations and their logistics requirements, particularly within MoD. Senior MoD officials were often unable to explain how the logistics and maintenance requirements that eventually become part of its budget submission were developed or vetted. MoD logistics officials were aware of the need to develop a logistics sustainment capability, but were stymied by systemic failures, such as planning on an annual basis rather than taking a multi-year approach. Further, MoD was unable to determine its total requirements; even when a requirement was identified and budgeted for, its contracting process was frequently unable to execute.

For example, approximately 75 to 80 percent of the inventory in the ISF was not adequately supported with essential replacement spare parts because the business systems and related processes at the MoD were dysfunctional or nonexistent.

The GoI must develop the capacity and the will to invest in building and sustaining its logistics capability and institutionalize the processes to support that investment.

**Requirements Generation.** USF-I recognized that the MoD requirements generation process was dysfunctional. In the April 2010 MEC assessment, ITAM-MoD rated “Policy and Requirements” red, indicating MoD was failing to meet required mission needs in developing a requirements-driven programming process. The assessment also defined the MoD ability to determine and prioritize mission needs through a functional “Policy and Requirements” capability as a critical requirement.

Interviews with ITAM-MoD advisors and key Iraqi logisticians indicated that the requirements generation process was broken:

- Nobody within the ministry seemed to know who was talking to whom to develop requirements, or
- What the process was for proposing requirements up the chain of command for consideration and ultimate ministerial decision-making.

Effective requirements generation is essential in the development and justification of MoD maintenance requirements in budget requests to the Ministry of Finance. While MoI recently developed a basic maintenance doctrine and was making progress in this area, MoD had no basic maintenance doctrine establishing guidance for how frequently maintenance had to be performed, where it had to be performed in the logistics system, processes for acquiring parts, or how to access the support of logistics depots. Although the Iraqis used requirements-driven planning in other areas, such as force generation, construction, and weapons system procurement, they failed to do so in the area of maintenance, mainly because the processes at the MoD, and to a lesser extent at the MoI, were dysfunctional or non-existent.

The processes in MoI that supported the development of requirements for sustainable logistics/maintenance were functioning better than those in MoD. Although MoI was struggling with the ability to procure the right types of repair parts in appropriate quantities, the senior MoI maintenance official knew exactly what had been requested by MoI for logistics and maintenance because he and his staff had developed the requirement. In contrast, a senior MoD Joint Headquarters logistician responsible for maintenance indicated that his staff was not consulted about spare parts requirements for MoD planning purposes. He said that logistics units regularly received heavy repair parts for which they had no use. However, what was really needed was a reliable process for providing basic 1<sup>st</sup> Line maintenance repair parts.

The Coalition’s past assistance in providing maintenance and repair parts through ISFF has not encouraged development of ISF ability to appreciate and act on the critical need to plan for maintenance. Recently, however, the GoI has chosen to provide maintenance support packages for some of their key systems through FMS (M1A1 tank, C-130). However, only about 20 to 25 percent of their total security equipment inventory (capital value) was covered by FMS. The end result was that 75 to 80 percent of the ISF vehicle and weapons

inventory was not adequately supported for repair parts through a functional requirements-driven process.

The lack of a functioning requirements generation process also affected the Iraqi Navy, which had virtually no maintenance support from the MoD over the past five years and had resorted to using low quality spare parts purchased on the local market. For example, a patrol boat ran aground last year and suffered extensive damage. Because the Iraqi Navy was only allowed a small monthly budget for repairs, it used those funds each month to buy parts piecemeal to repair the damaged boat. After one year, the Navy still did not have the necessary parts to make the damaged boat operational.

**Planning and Budgeting.** Like requirements generation, USF-I realized the MoD planning and budget process was dysfunctional. In the April 2010 MEC assessment conducted by A&T, “Planning & Programming” and “Budget Execution” categories were rated, “red,” signifying that MoD has failed to meet required mission needs in both developing and implementing a requirements-driven planning and programming process, and developing and implementing detailed monthly Execution Performance Reports. PPBE and the capacity to submit and execute capability-based/requirement-driven budgets were defined as critical requirements in this assessment. ITAM-MoD forecasted both processes would be “amber” by late 2010 and “green” by 2011. That forecast was not consistent with our own field inspection and the insight shared by those U.S. advisors and Iraqi officials with whom we met. Therefore, it appeared unlikely that current A&T capabilities and approach would be sufficient to improve MEC capability at MoD to the predicted levels in the timeframe available.

MoD officials stated that they did not receive sufficient funds to meet basic logistics sustainment demands of the IA, and moreover, the ministry did not efficiently execute the funding it did receive over the past few years. By the end of 2011, the MoD will have roughly \$10B in equipment in its inventory. A&T estimated that the MoD maintenance requirement that would meet standards acceptable to the Iraqis over time was 6 percent per year of the total equipment value, or about \$600 million. The annual requirement for MEC A&T used was roughly 3 percent of equipment value, or \$300 million (not including contractor logistics support). In 2009, Iraqi officials in the JHQ requested \$200 million for MoD maintenance requirements, which was short of both the \$600 million annual requirement and the lesser \$300 million MEC requirement. However, the actual budgeted amount in 2009 was \$53 million, and MoD only executed \$16 million of that.

Significant logistics challenges between now and December 2011, as defined by a senior Iraqi logistics officer, included insufficient budgeted funds for spares, maintenance, and repair parts. MoD only allocated \$40 million for 2010, which again fell substantially short of the estimated \$600 million annual maintenance requirement. Additionally, this senior Iraqi officer stated that he believed MoD was only capable of executing about 20 percent of what it received, but he also stated that he did not believe the MoD/JHQ processes for identifying requirements, budgeting, and executing (contracting) were broken.



Iraqi officials in the JHQ responsible for maintenance indicated that their budget requirements were not being met. In 2009 and 2010, he reported that the amount budgeted for maintenance across MoD was only a fraction of the requirement.

**Procurement.** MoD contracting had about 60 personnel who support aircraft, tank, ammo, and vehicle acquisitions--some of which was FMS-related. In the April 2010 MEC assessment, ITAM-MoD assigned a rating of “amber” to the “Contracts and Sales Direct Contracting” subcategory of “Procurement,” which was not consistent with the advisor comments we received. ITAM-MoD stated that the category of procurement would have a MEC of “green” by 2011. We are less optimistic about that assessment and believe that such an achievement is questionable without strong and immediate action.

The MoD contracting organization suffered from numerous challenges, including the areas of:

- Acquisition training,
- Requirements packages,
- Statement of work development,
- Market research,
- Advertisement,
- Paper-based processes, and
- Internet access.

ITAM MoD’s goal was to get 8 to 10 MoD contracting personnel certified through Defense Acquisition University. ITAM planned to mentor the MoD contracting officers personally, sitting with them at their computers and talking them through courses, such as Acquisition 101, to help develop an understanding of process/procedure that might be applicable to Iraqi systems.

Contracting personnel went through two courses at the Ministerial Training and Development Center in the International Zone, but those courses were fairly advanced, they did not cover logistics or life cycle costs, and student feedback was not good.

There were no metrics in place to track numbers of contract awards, process times, obligation rates or anything else that could indicate serious process problems. A Business Transformation Agency Task Force for Business and Stability Operations mentoring of Iraqi business practices through the Ministry of Planning had been completed, but the impact on the efficacy of Iraqi business processes was unknown or unapparent. In a letter signed by the Secretary of Defense on March 25, 2010, the Task Force was charged to continue to assist the operational commander in Iraq to connect the military campaign with the economic elements of U.S. national power. However, MoD and MoI advisors were unaware of any recent Task Force business improvement activity.

Joint Contracting Command Iraq-Afghanistan (JCCI-A) had the largest number of contracting officers on the ground in Iraq, including an office at FOB Union III. JCCI-A officers stated that Iraqi business mentoring was not part of their mission, nor were they resourced for such a mission.

## ***Conclusion***

The business processes in the MoD associated with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution were dysfunctional or nonexistent. Failure to reach that minimum essential capability by December 2011 will prevent ISF from developing a sustainable logistics capability; however, DCG A&T did not have the capacity to enable the ISF to build a functional PPBE system in the limited amount of time U.S. forces will remain in Iraq.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

5.a. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq, provide deployed assistance for a minimum of 180 days to help develop a functional planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process within the Ministry of Defense and to mentor and train appropriate Iraqi personnel on the use of those processes.

### ***Client Comments***

AT&L non-concurred with this recommendation, saying that, although they had a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) working in Iraq with DCG, A&T, they did not think that should become an enduring mission for AT&L. They recommended the requirement be programmed in staffing support requests from USF-I and later migrate to the Office of Security Cooperation.

### ***Our Response***

Given that staffing this requirement as a routine support request would take a minimum of six months and another three months, minimum, to source, we considered the recommended AT&L approach as too little/too late, given the USF-I end of mission on December 31, 2011. However, in follow-up coordination with AT&L, we determined that the current SES Director of ISF Strategic Logistics was going to be replaced by two members of the SES, who had already been identified. Furthermore, AT&L had supported contracting for additional Logistics Management Institute (LMI) personnel to assist with the ISF Strategic Directorate mission in A&T. Coordination with the current ISF Strategic Logistics Director confirmed the AT&L account. Although challenges remained, he thought he had received the assistance needed from AT&L to address PPBE issues in MoD. We consider the sum of the actions taken to be responsive to the intent of the recommendation and require no further action, at this time.

5.b. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq:

(1) Emphasize during Key Leader Engagements with Iraqi counterparts in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters, and Ministry of Interior the importance of planning and budgeting for maintenance requirements in order to sustain the operational performance of Iraq Security Forces equipment.

(2) Direct “Advise and Train” advisors to mentor their counterparts at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters, and Ministry of Interior on the importance of developing functional planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes for the requirement to sustain all Iraq Security Forces equipment.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations, noting that even though Key Leader Engagements already cover the importance of planning and budgeting for maintenance requirements, further emphasis is being applied on developing functional PPBE processes.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive; no additional comments are required.

## **Observation 6. High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Operational Readiness Rates**

Iraqi Army Commanders were hesitant to send High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), or other equipment, to the Joint Base Workshop (JBW) at Taji for maintenance or repair; however, the commanders often could not maintain the HMMWVs themselves because of a chronic shortage of repair parts.

This occurred because of a lack of trust in the maintenance system within the ISF. Commanders did not want to turn over unit HMMWVs or other equipment to the appropriate maintenance depot, even when the vehicles and equipment became non-operational, because they feared not being able to determine the location/status of their equipment and that it would not be returned in usable condition, if at all. Additionally, a general lack of repair parts and a dysfunctional ISF parts ordering process makes HMMWV operational-readiness rates problematic at all levels of maintenance.

As a result, the failure to establish a functional and reliable maintenance program, supported with an adequate and predictable supply of repair parts, were starting to degrade some HMMWV operational readiness rates to the point where some IA divisions will not be able to complete their assigned missions. For example, the operational readiness rate for HMMWVs in one IA division was less than 50 percent because of parts shortages. Moreover, the substantial investment made via ISFF and GoI fiscal sources will be lost.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides transition teams and organizations partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done.

**Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ), “DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009.** Chapter 6 describes the mission and function of the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and the processes and procedures for maintenance in the Iraqi Armed Services. Chapter 8—Iraqi Logistics Operations Center (ILOC) (DRAFT). The ILOC serves as a Strategic Level Logistics Operations Center for the collection and distribution of logistics information from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Naval Command and relevant Operational

Centers, and provides viable analysis to the JHQ in order to assist the decision-making process.

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and former Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

**American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

### ***HMMWV Readiness in the Iraqi Army***

For a variety of reasons, IA Commanders were reluctant to turn HMMWVs into Level 3 and 4 maintenance facilities for repair. The proximate cause of this reluctance was the fear that they would not get the vehicle back for a year or more and then it would arrive still in an unserviceable condition, perhaps stripped of certain parts it had when sent. The owning commander has no ability to forecast when his vehicles will be repaired and returned. Not trusting the maintenance system, the commander was apt to keep a non-operational HMMWV in his unit and try to obtain the necessary repair parts in the local market, even if unit mechanics were not authorized or trained to perform the required maintenance.

The lack of ongoing availability of basic HMMWV repair parts appeared to result from the larger issue regarding deficient ministerial planning, budgeting, and procuring, and an inefficient system for the distribution of all types of repair parts. There was simply no reliable repair parts system in place, according to advisor and Iraqi reports received by the team.

Aside from the issue of weak PPBE processes at the MoD, the IA had problems managing use of on-hand repair parts. While the IA did not maintain a Prescribed Load List of repair parts at the Brigade and Battalion level or an Authorized Stock List of repair parts at Division and above, they did have repair parts in stock. Reportedly, up to 80 percent of the stock did not service any type of equipment that they have on-hand. Furthermore, IA maintenance managers had not established reorder points for the lines of stock they have on-hand, often running to zero balance before ordering more. The IA was just starting to implement the automated IAMP system, which could increase visibility of available spare parts at all levels of the maintenance system, if properly used. However, there appeared to be a general reluctance on the part of IA maintenance managers to enter their available parts into this system and expose to what stock they had on-hand to others outside of their unit.

When repair parts were unavailable, including those for the HMMWV, IA mechanics were encouraged to obtain parts bought in the local markets. Unfortunately, these parts were far more expensive than those purchased through a reliable contracted source and of poorer quality. Most locally purchased parts were manufactured in Iran or China and, according to both U.S. and IA personnel, wore out or broke quickly.

A senior Iraqi logistics officer at the JHQ was focused on ensuring that there was a sufficient supply of spare parts, especially for HMMWVs. He estimated that it required the expenditure of about \$6 thousand per HMMWV per year to maintain them (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> lines) at the current operational tempo. Therefore, to maintain the fleet of over 7,800 HMMWVs would require about \$47 million per year in repairs and maintenance costs. Unfortunately, in CY 2010, MoD was only provided \$40 million to maintain all non-FMS supported equipment, to include HMMWVs, well short of the requirement to sustain these vehicles operationally ready.

U.S. trainers/advisors were working with the IA units to improve HMMWV operational readiness rates by:

- Increasing transparency in and use of established IA maintenance management processes,
- Mentoring the Iraqis to establish a HMMWV operational readiness float at Taji, and
- Establishing HMMWV readiness as a high-value sustainment initiative in order to influence multiple levels and elements of the logistics and fiscal processes and achieve key strategic outcomes and broad, enduring effects.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

6.a. Director, Logistics (J-4), United States Forces–Iraq, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense develop a plan to establish an operational readiness float of High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles at Taji National Depot from inbound vehicles supplied by the U.S. Equipment Transferred to Iraq program in order to alleviate excessive 4th line maintenance downtime.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation, stating that the USF-I J4 (Forward), in conjunction with STRATLOG and MoD is designing a concept to establish a HMMWV operational readiness float as described in the recommendation. Due to the expiration of the FY 2010 Section 1234 U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) authority on September 30, 2010, the command has no current authority to proceed with the transfer of these HMMWVs, but expects renewed authority when the FY 2011 Nation Defense Authorization Act is approved.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that USF-I J4 provide OIG with a copy of the plan to establish an ISF HMMWV operational readiness float, once it is completed.

6.b. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq coordinate with and mentor the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the Ministry of Defense Contracting/Budgeting offices to identify the parts requirements to sustain the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle fleet, budget for those requirements, and execute contracts to purchase a parts supply inventory according to predicted usage rates.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, provide OIG with a list of the identified critical HMMWV repair parts and an update on MoD/JHQ contract execution to procure these parts.

6.c. Commander, Army Materiel Command, in coordination with Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq, provide on-the-ground program management support for the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles High Value Sustainment Initiative led by the U.S. Iraq Security Forces Strategic Logistics Directorate.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, AMC, did not respond to the draft report requesting management comments.

### ***Our Response***

We ask that the Commander, AMC, respond to the final report.

## **Observation 7. Standard Tour Lengths for U.S. Personnel and Teams Assigned to United States Forces-Iraq (Advise and Train) That Mentor and Train the ISF.**

At the time of our visit, U.S. Army active duty soldiers assigned to USF-I A&T as mentors/trainers served 12-month tours. In contrast, Air Force active duty USF-I A&T personnel assigned as trainers/mentors served between 6 and 12-month tours. Some of the U.S. Army advisors at the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement Headquarters were being replaced with Air Force personnel on six-month tours.

The shortened tour lengths occurred because USF-I had not requested, and USCENTCOM did not establish a 12-month tour of duty requirement for A&T mentors/trainers in Request for Forces documents.

As a result, personnel from different military services assigned to A&T as mentor/trainers had varying tour lengths, which limited mentor performance and effectiveness. Personnel on six-month assignments did not generally have sufficient time to develop expertise in the performance of their duties, which requires building trust and confidence with their Iraqi counterparts.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force,” January 19, 2007.** This document establishes tour length policy for various DOD military components.

**DOD Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.** Observation 9 in this report discusses the impact of varying tour lengths on the effectiveness of U.S. mentors and trainers in Afghanistan. The discussion is applicable to U.S. mentors and trainers in Iraq.

**USCENTCOM Request for Forces Serial 1018 (Classified).** This document requests forces to support mentoring and partnering of GoI ministries.

### ***Mentors/Trainers at the Department of Border Enforcement Headquarters***

At the time of our visit, USF-I A&T had 12 active duty U.S. Army personnel and 2 contractors advising and training the Iraqi Border Police at the Department of Border Enforcement Headquarters. The 12 active duty personnel were due to redeploy in July 2010. The replacement team was to be comprised of seven Air Force personnel and the rest Army. The Air Force personnel had orders for 6-month tours and the Army personnel had orders for 12-month tours. Army advisors stated that they had replaced Air Force personnel in 2009 who had served 1-year tour lengths.



A review of the USCENTCOM RFF Serial 1018 (Classified) request for additional forces to support mentoring and partnering of GoI ministries determined that USCENTCOM did not specify tour length requirements.

Although the situation described with U.S. Air Force advisors in the Department of Border Enforcement Headquarters is a single example, the lack of specificity in the RFF represents a systemic issue that could affect mentor/trainer tour lengths elsewhere in USF-I A&T.

### ***Importance of Tour Lengths***

Continuity in mentor/trainer tour lengths affects everything from troop morale in units to job performance efficiency and, ultimately, mission effectiveness.

Personnel with tour lengths shorter than 1 year increased the training requirements for team members with longer tour lengths who must repeatedly train new personnel to integrate them into the operational mission. This reduced the time available to actually perform the mission. Operational tempo-momentum suffered accordingly, and the mentoring progress was impeded.

The ability of mentoring teams to increase the capability and performance of their Iraqi counterparts was also negatively impacted because personnel serving for 6 months did not have sufficient time or opportunity to grasp the mentoring fundamentals through hands-on experience or to establish the necessary relationships with their Iraqi counterparts.

Having sufficient tour lengths to build an effective mentoring/training team is especially critical since the mentoring process takes time and becomes more fruitful over an extended period. Tour lengths of less than 12 months are generally insufficient for effective mentoring. Simply stated, longer tour lengths contribute to greater continuity of the U.S. mentoring effort.

### **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

<p>7. Commander, United States Forces–Iraq, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command, should revise Request For Forces documents to specify 12-month tour lengths as the minimum requirement for U.S. personnel/teams involved in mentoring/training the Iraq Security Forces.</p>
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#### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation, noting they would explore options to ensure tour lengths were 12-months in duration.

#### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that Commander, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the revised RFF documents specifying 12-month tour lengths as the minimum requirement for U.S. mentoring/training teams.

## **Observation 8. Authorized Positions for the USF-I Iraq Security Forces Strategic Logistics Directorate**

The U.S. Advise and Train Joint Manning Document did not contain any permanently authorized positions for the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate because that office was initially set up as an ad hoc organization, and USF-I (DCG A&T) had not created or transferred Joint Manning Document billets from other staff areas.

Unless the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate is institutionalized, the ISF could lose capability prior to USF-I end of mission in December 2011, which may also adversely affect the organization and staffing of the future Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq office.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” January 1, 2004.** This instruction provides guidance for assigning individual augmentation, to meet the combatant commanders’ and other government agencies temporary duty requirements supporting the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense directed or approved operations.

**MNSTC-I FRAGO 09-047, “Formation of Iraqi Security Forces Strategic Logistics Directorate,” DTG 281800C, September 2009.** This fragmentary order established the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate as the single unifying strategic logistics organization reporting directly to the MNSTC-I Commanding General (now DCG A&T).

### ***Authorized Positions***

In May 2010, the Director of ISF Strategic Logistics indicated that there were no JMD authorizations for his staff. He also stated that the personnel currently assigned had been put in place on a “by name” request to the senior leadership of the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Logistics Agency. Without formal Joint Manning Document positions established for those positions, the office staff could be degraded over time, as current personnel rotate out of Iraq.

That degradation would likely limit the ability of the Office of Strategic Logistics to perform what appears to be a uniquely valuable role in building key capabilities in the ISF logistics system. As a result, accomplishing logistics sustainment capabilities within the ISF could be negatively impacted during the critical months remaining before end of mission. In addition, the vital support provided so far by this office in the organization of a post-December 2011 Office of Security Cooperation could also be reduced.

At the time of our visit, the DCG A&T was considering realigning two JMD military billets (Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel) and 11 civilian billets to the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate to address the problem.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

8. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq, finalize the addition or realignment of existing Joint Manning Document billets to ensure that Iraq Security Forces Strategic Logistics Directorate will be adequately staffed through December 2011.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the revised Joint Manning Document reflecting the updated billets for the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate.

## **Observation 9. Oversight Responsibility for Equipment and Materiel Transferred to ISF**

The drawdown of A&T personnel may diminish A&T's capacity to provide oversight of U.S.-funded and/or provided equipment arriving in Iraq through the end of mission in December 2011.

While USF-I has the requirement to provide oversight of the U.S.-funded and provided equipment and materiel being transferred to the ISF, the number of personnel available to carry out that oversight requirement is declining due to the responsible drawdown.

As a result, the failure to plan for sufficient personnel resources to provide oversight of U.S.-provided equipment and materiel transferred to the ISF could lead to a loss of accountability or inappropriate use. Moreover, the U.S. financial investment in that materiel could be wasted.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**22 U.S.C. § 2403: U.S. Code--Section 2403: Definitions.** Defines "defense article" in subsection (d) (3) to include, among other things:

any machinery, facility, tool, materiel supply, or other item  
necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair,  
servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use  
of any article listed in this subsection.

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), January 28, 2008.** Section 1228 of the Act sets forth the requirements for the tracking and monitoring of defense articles provided to the Government of Iraq.

**DOD Instruction 4140.66, "Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles," October 15, 2009.** This document establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and sets forth procedures in accordance with section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 to certify the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export and/or transfer of defense articles to specified countries and/or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of those countries.

### ***U.S. Government Oversight Requirements***

As per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the U.S. government is responsible for the tracking and monitoring of defense articles provided to the GoI. Section 1228 of the Act reads as follows:

*(C) REGISTRATION AND MONITORING SYSTEM – The registration and monitoring system required under this subsection shall include –*

*(1) the registration of the serial numbers of all small arms to be provided to the Government of Iraq or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of Iraq;*

- (2) *a program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles provided to such entities or individuals; and*
- (3) *a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program to such entities or individuals.*

The requirements of this Act have been incorporated into DOD policy in DOD Instruction 4140.66, "Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles," October 15, 2009.

Although the drawdown of U.S. forces is expected to be complete by December 2011, the ISF will still be receiving U.S.-funded equipment and materiel well beyond that date – equipment and materiel that will still require official transfer, and, in some instances, tracking and monitoring by U.S. personnel. This equipment includes that acquired through ISFF as well as any equipment transferred via the U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) program.

### ***Oversight Practices***

At the time of our visit, USF-I mentors were responsible for tracking and monitoring ISFF and USETTI equipment and materiel transferred to the ISF. The requirement for oversight varied depending on the type of equipment or materiel. For example, weapons and night vision devices were transferred to the ISF by serial number, repair parts were transferred by shipment at Taji or Baghdad Police College, and the delivery of major end items, such as HMMWVs, howitzers, and tanks, was tracked to the Brigade and Battalion level. The oversight requirement must be fulfilled not only through the USF-I end of mission in December 2011, but for varying lengths of time afterwards, consistent with deliveries into Iraq. Due to the long lead times required to order, manufacture, ship, and distribute certain types of U.S.-funded equipment, delivery to the ISF can be expected well into and beyond 2012.

Concurrent with the drawdown, excess U.S. equipment will also be transferred to ISF units via the USETTI program. At the present time, the oversight requirements for USETTI were similar to ISFF-provided materiel and equipment; however, the A&T personnel drawdown may diminish its capacity to provide accountability and control of equipment arriving through the end of mission. Further, until a formal policy is in place that defines the ongoing equipment oversight requirements after end of mission, it cannot be determined what the requirement is for U.S. personnel to provide oversight of U.S.-supplied ISFF and USETTI equipment beyond December 2011, in order to meet the requirements set forth in Public Law 110-181 and DOD Instruction 4140.66.

### ***Office of Security Cooperation***

Before the December 2011 end of mission for U.S. military forces in Iraq, the security assistance / cooperation mission will be transferred from the DOD to a new Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy Baghdad. At the time of the assessment visit in April 2010, the Office of Security Cooperation was still in the concept phase, and USF-I staff, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, were in the process of developing notional organizational structures. Defining firm oversight and end-use-

monitoring requirements will be critical in determining the number of personnel required from the DOD to support the new office.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

9. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq:

a. In coordination with United States Forces-Iraq, ensure sufficient personnel with the appropriate skills are assigned to provide necessary oversight through the end of mission in December 2011 for inbound equipment and materiel provided through the Iraq Security Forces Fund and U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq program.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with the recommendation, stating that support for this recommendation is identified in the USF-I transition plan of programs, projects, activities, and tasks currently being conducted by USF-I. These specific activities will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy – Baghdad and the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq. The members of the logistics section will be fully qualified and tasked with the mission to support the continued development of the ISF's logistical capabilities. Further support of this recommendation is addressed in OSC-I Supporting Plan on FRAGO 10-01.4.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We have reviewed the USF-I transition plan, and note that the Logistics Section in Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq is programmed for 29 personnel, with an SES Chief of Section. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the aforementioned OSC-I Supporting Plan and corresponding fragmentary order.

9. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq:

b. In coordination with United States Forces-Iraq, United States Central Command, and the Department of State, define the requirements for oversight of inbound equipment and materiel provided through the Iraq Security Forces Fund and U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq program that will or could arrive after end of mission in December 2011.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation. In conjunction with the development of OPOD 11-01, a working group was established to define the requirements for oversight of equipment and materiel provided via ISFF and the USETTI program, should it extend beyond end of mission in December 2011.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, AT&, USF-I, provide a copy of OPOD 11-01 or other applicable document that defines the future requirements for

oversight of equipment and materiel provided via ISFF and the USETTI program to the ISF.

9. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq:

c. Ensure that planning for the transfer of the Security Assistance mission from the Department of Defense to the Department of State incorporates the personnel requirements to provide the required level of oversight.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with the recommendation, stating that support for this recommendation is identified in the USF-I transition plan of programs, projects, activities, and tasks currently being conducted by USF-I. These specific activities will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy – Baghdad and the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq. The members of the logistics section will be fully qualified and tasked with the mission to support the continued development of the ISF's logistical capabilities. Further support of this recommendation is addressed in OSC-I Supporting Plan on FRAGO 10-01.4.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We have reviewed the USF-I transition plan, and note that the Logistics Section in Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq is programmed for 29 personnel, with an SES Chief of Section. We require no additional input from the Command on this issue.

## **Observation 10. Training for U.S. Logistics Mentors and Trainers on ISF Logistics Systems**

Although many U.S. logistics mentors/trainers reported that they received some pre-deployment and in-country training focused on the ISF logistics systems and mentoring ISF development, that training took place through multiple venues and was sometimes disjointed and ineffective.

That resulted because of insufficient coordination of an integrated and cohesive USF-I, USCENTCOM, and U.S. Forces Command (USFORSCOM) program approach to pre-deployment and in-country training for personnel assuming logistics mentor positions and responsibilities.

Failure to provide sufficient and effective training to inbound U.S. logistics mentors/trainers on ISF logistics systems prior to assuming their duties has limited their initial effectiveness and could slow the development of an enduring ISF logistics system.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**DOD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training,” January 13, 2009.** This DOD directive states that:

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations...

The Heads of the DOD Components shall Ensure, through commanders and managers at all levels within their Components, that the personnel and organizations under their cognizance are qualified to perform their Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to established competency and proficiency standards.

### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

### **USFORSCOM Message: Subject/2008 Revised Transition Team**

**Training Guidance, March 2008.** This message provides updated training guidance for transition teams deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This document replaces the former Iraq Assistance Group training guidance DTG 182148Z Jan 07 and aligns previous guidance for transition teams deploying to Southwest Asia with USFORSCOM training guidance for follow on forces deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This message directs that all transition team personnel are to conduct pre-deployment training in accordance with this message.



**USFORSCOM Message: Subject/Specified Training Requirements for Advisory Teams and In Lieu of (ILO) Elements, January 2010.** This message describes modifications to task organization and training for deploying brigades providing advisory teams, transition teams, and provincial reconstruction teams resulting from the recent shift in emphasis on the security force assistance mission in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**USFORSCOM Message: Subject/FORSCOM Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-On Forces Deploying in Support of Southwest Asia (SWA), May 2010.** This message provides a stand-alone document which does not require referencing prior messages, and incorporates requirements and procedures identified in Headquarters, Department of the Army Execution Order 150-08, Subject: “Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy.” It is used to guide development of unified and collaborative reserve component pre-deployment training plans.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides U.S. military transition teams and units partnered with Iraqi forces a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done. The book does not address procedures internal to the transition teams, partner units, or their chains of command.

**ITAM-Logistics, “Ministry of Interior Advisor Logistics Handbook (2010 Edition),” November 23, 2009.** This document provides a “How To” guide in the areas of supply, maintenance, and fuel for the MoI.

### ***Pre-Deployment and In-Country Training for U.S. Logistics Mentors/Trainers***

For the U.S. to fully utilized the relatively short time left until the USF-I end of mission in December 2011 to further develop the logistics sustainment base of the ISF, it is imperative for U.S. logistics mentors and trainers to arrive in-country fully prepared to execute their mission. To minimize the on-the-ground learning curve, the pre-deployment training program should be integrated and coordinated across the multiple venues and organizations responsible for preparing U.S. mentors and trainers to deploy.

However, discussions with U.S. logistics mentors and trainers in the Advise and Assist Brigades, the Logistics Military Advisory Teams (LMATs) and the A&T command indicated that they had received varying degrees of training on the ISF logistics system prior to their deployment to Iraq. They indicated that the instruction received through training classes and doctrinal publications did not flow well and was spread out over time in bits and pieces, resulting in the training seeming disjointed and ineffective.

The various reported training venues included:

- Compact discs received at home station that had documents detailing the ISF logistics systems.
- The option of choosing a day-long training session on ISF logistics systems while participating in unit/team training for mentors and trainers conducted by the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade at Ft. Polk, LA.
- Discussions on ISF logistics systems during training sessions conducted by 162d Infantry Training Brigade mobile training teams from Ft. Polk, LA.
- Compact discs with briefings and documents provided in Kuwait from the Iraq Training Assistance Mission.
- In-country training at the Counterinsurgency Special Operations Center at Taji.
- Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority discussions with outbound logistics mentors/trainers.

Doctrinal publications and briefings regarding ISF logistics systems that provide a basis for ISF logistics pre-deployment training included:

- “Iraq Training and Advisory Mission Ministry of Interior Advisor Logistics Handbook,” 2010 Edition, November 23, 2009,
- “Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ) DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009 (English version)
- Briefing by the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate, “MoD/JHQ Planning/Budget/Requirements Annual Cycle,”
- MoD Contracting and FMS processes flow charts,
- Director of Infrastructure for the MoI letter describing the MoI supply chain,
- Iraq Training Assistance Mission Briefing describing the MoI Logistics Distribution Network,
- “How the Iraqi Army Operates,” Edition 3, Chapter 6—Logistics,
- Briefing by U.S. Federal Police Transition Team, “Sustainment Brigade & Sustainment Operations,” April 1, 2010,
- Briefing by ITAM, “Ministry of Interior Concept of Support,” undated and,
- Briefing by ITAM, “Maintenance Support Vehicles & Weapons (MoI),” undated.

A cohesive program of instruction that integrates and coordinates the various training venues and publications on the ISF logistics systems can help reduce the on-the-ground learning curve for U.S. logistics mentors and trainers.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

10. Commander, United States Forces-Iraq, in coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq, United States Central Command, and United States Army Forces Command, take steps to develop an integrated and cohesive program of instruction on the logistics systems of the Iraq Security Forces that can be provided at unit home stations prior to deployment.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that Commander, USF-I, provide the OIG a summary of actions taken to implement this recommendation.

## **Part III – Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Military**

This section contains a series of observations and recommendations concerning the Ministry of Defense (MoD), MoD Joint Headquarters, and the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force.



## **Observation 11. Warehouse Management at the Joint Repair Parts Command at Taji**

U.S. efforts to establish an effective warehouse management system for repair parts at the Joint Repair Parts Command (JRPC) at Taji National Depot (TND) was in jeopardy and U.S. mentor expertise and oversight capability will be degraded due to the pending departure of both military officers and DOD civilians in October 2010 and the absence of plans to replace them.

In addition to failing to complete the development of a national warehousing system for repair parts and other supplies, the absence of those U.S. mentors could result in the loss of positive oversight of millions of dollars of inbound and on-hand repair parts purchased with ISFF that require inventory and warehousing.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**22 U.S.C. § 2403: U.S. Code - Section 2403: Definitions.** Defines "defense article" in subsection (d) (3) to include, among other things:

any machinery, facility, tool, materiel supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection.

### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, "Stability Operations," September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), January 28, 2008.** Section 1228 of the Act sets forth the requirements for the tracking and monitoring of defense articles provided to the Government of Iraq.

**DOD Instruction 4140.66, "Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles," October 15, 2009.** This document establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and sets forth procedures in accordance with section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 to certify the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export and/or transfer of defense articles to specified countries and/or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of those countries.

### ***Defense Logistics Agency's Roles and Responsibilities***

The DLA advisory team at Taji provided training and mentoring support to establish an effective warehouse management system within ISF for Class IX materiel at the National Depot level. The advisory team, composed of one military officer and two civilian subject matter experts, in coordination with A&T and the IA, were developing a comprehensive 5-

year plan to establish a new supply and distribution center at Taji, which included facilities design, distribution process management systems, new technology recommendations, stock positioning strategies, stocking and picking management, material handling equipment operation, and maintenance and safety procedures.

As part of the 5-year plan, several warehouses that had been left by the old IA were being refurbished for use, and new warehouses were being built, most of which were expected to be completed and stocked with critical parts by November 2010.

The U.S. advisory team had successfully completed a joint, 100 percent inventory of all repair parts stored in the existing warehouses; however, there were numerous parts and supplies that were not stored inside the warehouses, but rather outside in connex boxes or totally unprotected. At the time of our assessment, there were an estimated 500 connexes of parts that required inventory and proper warehouse storage and accountability. The DLA team subsequently reported that an actual inventory of those parts had been completed at the end of June 2010.

As warehouse space became available through ongoing construction, the DLA team planned to work with their IA counterparts to determine which parts were critical and move them from the connexes and open-air storage areas into the new warehouse spaces. The team was also making progress in helping the Iraqis to establish and expand the Iraqi Asset Management Program database, an automated program for managing vehicle maintenance and Class IX repair parts inventory.

### ***Critical Need for U.S. Support***

It was evident that the establishment of an effective and sustainable warehouse management system at Taji's JRPC depot, including the appropriate training of IA personnel, depended upon continued advisory support by the DLA team. However, the DLA team was scheduled to redeploy back to the U.S. in September and December 2010, and there were no plans to replace them.

Without an effective system at the JRPC national depot and the ability to effectively manage repair parts inventory, medium and field-level workshops supporting IA divisions will not be supplied with necessary vehicle repair parts--exacerbating an existing problem--that could lead to chronically low readiness levels for IA vehicles and weapons systems.

### ***U.S. Government Oversight Requirements***

As per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the U.S. Government is responsible for tracking and monitoring Defense articles provided to the GoI. Section 1228 of the Act states:

*(C) REGISTRATION AND MONITORING SYSTEM – The registration and monitoring system required under this subsection shall include –*

*(4) the registration of the serial numbers of all small arms to be provided to the Government of Iraq or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of Iraq;*

- (5) *a program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles provided to such entities or individuals; and*  
(6) *A detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program to such entities or individuals.*

The DLA advisory team at the JRPC at Taji was essential in providing the oversight required by U.S. law, and by DODI 4140.66. Its pending departure, with no backfill provided by either DLA or the U. S. Army Materiel Command, will weaken U.S. oversight of ISFF-provided repair parts and their timely distribution to lower-level depots and line units of the IA, and could have damaging consequences.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

11.a. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, in coordination with the J4, United States Forces-Iraq, determine the requirement for continuing oversight and training assistance at the Joint Repair Parts Command through December 2011, ensuring that necessary external assistance is provided.

### **Client Comments**

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### **Our Response**

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, provide the OIG with details of the actions taken to assign qualified personnel to provide oversight and training assistance at the JRPC.

11.b. Commander, Army Materiel Command, provide advisory assistance as required and requested by the J-4, United States Forces-Iraq and/or the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training), United States Forces-Iraq, to support the development of the Joint Repair Parts Command at Taji National Depot through United States Forces-Iraq's end of mission in December 2011.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, AMC, did not respond to the draft report requesting management comments

### **Our Response**

We ask that Commander, AMC, respond to the final report.





## **Observation 12. Availability of Critical Repair Parts**

While the total requirement for various types of repair parts in the IA constituted several thousand line items, there were indications that a reliable supply of as few as 50 lines of repair parts used to maintain critical vehicle and weapons systems could reduce the maintenance backlog by a significant factor.

The shortage of critical repair parts occurred because the Iraqi logistics officers at the JHQ had not analyzed which types of critical parts were most in demand or the minimum inventory of critical parts required to maintain operational readiness at an acceptable level.

Completion of that analysis and the implementation of the resulting strategy could provide a more manageable way ahead for significantly increasing and maintaining readiness of critical equipment at a relatively modest cost and quickly increase confidence in the capability of the Medium Workshops. Additionally, establishing a functional direct exchange system at the JHQ EME Level 3 Maintenance Medium Workshops for key repair components could further increase operational readiness rates.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This document provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides transition teams and organizations partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done.

**Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ), “DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009.** Chapter 6 describes the mission and function of the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and the processes and procedures for maintenance in the Iraqi Armed Services. Chapter 8—Iraqi Logistics Operations Center (ILOC) (DRAFT). The ILOC serves as a Strategic Level Logistics Operations Center for the collection and distribution of logistics information from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Naval Command and relevant Operational Centers, and provides viable analysis to the JHQ in order to assist the decision-making process.

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook

was developed by former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the former Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

### **American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010**

**Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

### ***Unreliable Supply of Repair Parts***

The U.S. Logistics Military Advisory Team (LMAT) supporting the Numaniyah Location Command, a regional support depot, and the Medium Workshop located there, completed a study of repair parts usage rates and determined that, of the several thousand types of repair parts (lines) needed to support the diverse fleet of IA vehicles, a reliable supply of just 50 specific repair parts could cut the not mission capable rate by about 42 percent and that a reliable supply of only 15 specific lines could cut the “not mission capable” rate by as much as 33 percent.

U.S. trainers estimated that the IA’s Joint Repair Parts Command stocked about 19,000 line items throughout its logistics system and of those, 3,000 were considered critical items. However, those 3,000 lines were all at zero balance and, therefore, unavailable for distribution to the IA units. The Joint Repair Parts Command received over 11,000 requests for the critical parts represented by the 3,000 lines by March 2010, but has had to return the requests without being filled because the parts were not available in its inventory.

### ***Direct Exchange System for Repair Parts***

The LMAT at Numaniyah also reported that the Medium Workshop had developed a direct exchange system since it did not receive sufficient quantities of repair parts for critical vehicles such as HMMWVs. By purchasing certain materiel on the local market (e.g., asbestos, wiring, glue), the mechanics at the Numaniyah Medium Workshop were able to refurbish HMMWV brake shoes and rebuild starters. That simple direct exchange system has proven popular with IA-supported units, as they can bring in unserviceable, but repairable HMMWV brakes and starters and receive a serviceable replacement part right away. As HMMWV brakes and starters were often the reason for a “not mission capable” status, that direct exchange system has served to increase the operational readiness of HMMWVs in Army units supported by the Numaniyah Medium Workshop.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

12. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq:

a. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to identify a near-term source of a reliable supply of high impact repair parts for critical equipment and mentor the establishment of such a supply system within the ISF logistics area.

b. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, to establish and fund a direct exchange system at the Medium Workshops for brakes and starters and other high use components.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, specify what steps have been or will be taken to identify a reliable supply of high impact repair parts for critical equipment and to establish a direct exchange system at the ISF's Medium Workshops.



## **Observation 13. Ministry of Defense Fuel Supply System Disincentive**

IA Division Commanders were not sending their broken-down vehicles to 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> line maintenance repair; instead, they tended to keep the unserviceable vehicles on-hand at their divisions.

This occurred because the MoD fuel supply policy, which provided fuel to IA Division Commanders on the basis of the quantity and types of vehicles listed on their property books at any given time, acted as a disincentive for Commanders to send their vehicles out for maintenance repair because the Commander lost the fuel allocation while the vehicle was out for repair.

As a result, the MoD fuel supply policy contributed to the likelihood that the IA vehicle fleet would fall into increasing disrepair and lower operational readiness.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides transition teams and organizations partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done.

### ***Iraqi Army Fuel Voucher Process***

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance publication, “How the Iraqi Army Operates”, states the following in regards to the fuel voucher process:

Fuel authorizations are not produced as a result of forecasting operational tempo and requirements. Fuel authorizations are produced based on a unit’s equipment density. Each unit will be authorized the same amount of fuel per month based on the quantity and type of equipment they possess. This system may cause units to fail to report damaged vehicles or code out destroyed vehicles to prevent losing the fuel allocations.

Equipment fuel authorizations were as follows:

- Motorized vehicles – 30 Liters
- Heavy motorized vehicles – 30 Liters
- Armored vehicles – 40 Liters
- Generators – 20 to 400 Liters (depending on size)

### ***Effects of Fuel Voucher Process***

Several IA Commanders expressed their concern and frustration with the MoD system of fuel allocation. One Division Commander stated that he was hesitant to turn-in damaged

vehicles to the Location Command or Taji for maintenance because he would lose the fuel allocation for that vehicle, and he rarely received enough fuel to operate all of his vehicles anyway. He was also reluctant because he feared the vehicle would never be returned from the maintenance facility. As a consequence, he said he would rather keep unusable vehicles than be deprived of his fuel allotment and risk losing the vehicles forever.

Another Location Commander echoed similar sentiments. He was allotted 20 liters of fuel per day per vehicle, but if he sent a vehicle to a higher level maintenance facility, he would not receive any fuel for that vehicle until it was returned. He believed it was more advantageous to keep unserviceable vehicles in order to continue receiving full fuel allocations and have enough fuel to operate the rest of his fleet. He also expressed concern about ever getting his vehicles back from the maintenance facility.

U.S. mentors were working diligently with their IA and MoD counterparts to overcome the pervasive lack of confidence evident in the Army's maintenance system. This has proven difficult, however, in part due to the fuel allocation disincentive. Without a change to MoD policy regarding the allocation of fuel to Army units, location and division commanders can be expected to continue to hold their vehicles needing higher level maintenance. The effect over time has been a degradation in vehicle operational readiness, which has not been accurately conveyed in unit readiness reporting.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

13. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces–Iraq, advise and mentor the Ministry of Defense to develop a more effective system of fuel forecasting and allocation to the Iraqi Army divisions based on operational tempo and mission requirements in order to remove the disincentive to evacuate vehicles to higher-line maintenance facilities.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, identify the steps that have been or will be taken to assist the MoD in developing a more effective system of fuel forecasting and allocation to the Iraqi Army divisions.

## **Observation 14. Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement**

The DOD did not have an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in place with the MoD to facilitate any logistics assistance required by the GoI after end-of-mission in December 2011.

This occurred because, as of the time of the assessment visit in March 2010, senior officials in the Ministry of Defense were unwilling to sign an ACSA with the DOD.

As a result, U.S. forces may inadvertently provide certain types of logistics support without appropriate authority, and ISF security operations could be interrupted in the future due to the lack of U.S.-supplied logistics support.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**DOD Directive 2010.9, “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,” April 28, 2003.** The directive updates policy for the acquisition from and transfer to authorized foreign governments logistics support, supplies, and services.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2120.01A, “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,” November 27, 2006.**

This instruction provides policy and procedural guidance concerning the use of the legal ACSA authorities contained in Sections 2341-2350 of title 10, United States Code. This guidance is directed to the combatant commands (including USCENTCOM) and Defense agencies reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also summarizes the responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Military Departments.

### ***Necessity for Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement with the Government of Iraq***

It is DOD policy that its Components are authorized to acquire, and in some cases to provide, logistics support, supplies, and services directly from or to eligible countries and international organizations.

USCENTCOM has been coordinating with USF-I pursuant to concluding an ACSA with the GoI for ISF logistics support. The ACSA is the baseline document that would facilitate future development of additional logistics arrangements between DOD and the ISF through a Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Agreement. The ACSA is worked through three standard transaction vehicles:

- Replacement in kind – repayment by providing the same kind of logistics support,
- Currency – direct payment for services rendered, and
- Equal Value Exchange – repayment by another type of equal value logistics support.



In the past, MoD received logistics support through U.S. funding sources, such as ISFF, utilizing MNSTC-I/A&T-orchestrated direct purchases or pseudo-FMS cases -- applying the FMS system, but with U.S. financing. Thus far, MoD has demonstrated little interest in finalizing an ACSA, according to USF-I A&T officers. However, because ISFF is likely to end, the GoI appears to be more interested in reaching an agreement. An ACSA bilateral agreement with the GoI would be in line with USF-I A&T efforts to wean MoD off of U.S.-funded support and incentivize it to become more self-reliant.

USCENTCOM indicated that its authority was delegated to Multi-National Force-Iraq (now USF-I) in 2008 to reach an ACSA with the GoI. According to USCENTCOM, there were several delays in the negotiations and two signature ceremonies to date had been cancelled by the Iraqis for unknown reasons.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

14. Commander, United States Forces-Iraq, in coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, the U.S. Mission Baghdad, and U.S. Central Command, complete negotiations with the current or next government and sign an Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement with the Ministry of Defense prior to United States Forces-Iraq end of mission on December 31, 2011.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that Commander, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the signed Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement once completed.

## **Observation 15. The Joint Base Workshop at Taji National Depot**

Several logistics system deficiencies existed at the Joint Base Workshop (JBW) at Taji National Depot, including:

- No electric power for the equipment in the Small Arms Workshop,
- Hydraulic fabrication/test equipment for the M1A1 not approved or cleared for use,
- Track workshop equipment held up in customs at border entry points, and
- Need for more detailed training on equipment use.

Those deficiencies occurred because of:

- An incorrectly written or poorly executed contract that provided electrical power to the junction box on the side of the building housing the Small Arms Workshop, but did not wire the building itself.
- Pending decisions regarding the location of the M1A1 tank depot-level maintenance facility.
- Lack of coordination and paperwork/tariff fee issues at the border entry points.
- A tendency of the IA staff on location to rely on the U.S. advisors and mentors for training, rather than determining their own needs and funding it themselves.

Those issues caused the Joint Base Workshop to be less than fully effective and led to operational readiness issues across the IA that could worsen in the future.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This DODI provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

### ***The Joint Base Workshop at Taji National Depot***

The JBW was comprised of two depots: the wheel depot and the track depot. Together, they provided the 4<sup>th</sup> line maintenance (depot level) capability of the IA.

The wheel depot, transferred to Iraqi control in December 2009, consisted of eight rebuild/overhaul facilities focused on HMMWVs and 5-ton vehicles:

- Vehicles were disassembled in the main wheel facility,
- Components were sent to subordinate shops for overhaul or rebuild,
- Vehicle components were returned to the main wheel for reassembly, and
- Vehicles were returned to the unit or ready for re-issue through the supply system.

Maintenance output in the wheel depot was evaluated as still weak. A major issue was the lack of availability of HMMWV repair parts for the wheel production line, as well as other critical spare parts.

The track depot consisted of 12 rebuild/overhaul facilities focused on BMP-1s (Soviet-era armored personnel carriers) and T-72 tanks:

- Vehicles were disassembled in the disassembly facility,
- Components were sent to subordinate shops for overhaul or rebuild,
- Vehicle components were sent to reassembly for reassembly, and
- Vehicles were returned to the field unit or tagged for re-issue through the supply system.

The JBW commander indicated that the track depot represented his biggest challenge. MoD has been paying salaries of over \$1M per month to staff the JBW, but production of repaired/refurbished/rebuilt T-72 tanks was zero. The JBW commander also indicated that he did not have adequately trained personnel. His maintenance personnel were insufficiently trained on the available equipment and had received no training on the equipment that was due in. On-site training at Taji for the track depot equipment, especially repair equipment for the Iraqi M1A1 tanks, was needed, according to the JBW Commander. (U.S. advisors stated that they were not trained to operate all of the equipment in the track depot and had offered to assist MoD with contracting for additional training.)

MoD had not decided where the 4<sup>th</sup> line (depot level) M1A1 maintenance should be based. The JBW commander made a strong recommendation that the facility be established at Taji in the JBW. There were two hydraulic test/fabrication stands for the M1A1 already in the JBW Track Workshop, although not yet connected to electrical power and without trained IA personnel to operate them. U.S. contractors present at the track workshop indicated they had connected the equipment twice already but were then told to disconnect it. Contractor support for those two test/fabrications stands ended in May 2010.

Site personnel indicated that there was some maintenance equipment delayed at the border pending payment of tariffs. The USF-I J-4 was aware of the problem and was coordinating with the contractor to pay the tariffs so the equipment could enter the country and be installed at the depot. But, reportedly, that had been a recurring problem.

In addition to the wheel and track depots, there were four repair facilities that provided the following 3rd line (direct support) level repair:

- Ground Support Equipment,
- Generator Shop, and
- Small Arms.

The small arms shop had no electrical power. The contract let by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ran power up to the junction box on the building, but did not wire the building itself. The Iraqis had 4,000 unserviceable and/or captured enemy weapons ready to be demilitarized, but no power to do it.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

15.a. Director, Logistics (J-4), United States Forces-Iraq:

(1) Coordinate with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to complete installation of power from the junction box on the outside of the small arms workshop building to the equipment inside.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I partially concurred with this recommendation, noting that the U.S. Government had identified existing deficiencies that were preventing the full commissioning of the Small Arms Repair Facility. Due to delays caused by changing priorities, incomplete Corps of Engineers infrastructure modifications, and unrealized requirements for installed equipment, additional work was needed to bring the facility to initial operating capacity in accordance with the Statement of Work.

The contract will, therefore, be modified to complete electrical repairs, equipment installation, and commissioning efforts to bring the Small Arms Repair Facility up to a fully functional Level Four Maintenance facility, with all the proposed modifications being within the scope of the contract. A full proposal is expected no later than October 31, 2010, and Tier 1 repairs and training are projected to be complete by December 31, 2010.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that USF-I J4 forward to the OIG the approved contract modifications for the Small Arms Repair Facility.

15.a. Director, Logistics (J-4), United States Forces-Iraq:

(2) In coordination with the Ministry of Defense and, if appropriate, the U.S. Department of State, determine the final location for the depot maintenance facility for the Iraqi Army M1A1 tank and, if not at Taji, coordinate with the Iraqi Army for the removal of the M1A1 hydraulic fabrication/test equipment to the new designated location.

(3) In coordination with the appropriate contracting office, ensure that contractors, or other responsible parties, pay the customs on the Joint Base workshop equipment held at border entry points.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations, noting that all customs-related payments have been paid by the current contractor resulting in the delivery of equipment needed to complete installation at the Joint Base Workshop.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments to Recommendation 15.a.(2) were not responsive in that the USF-I J4 did not indicate if a final location had been chosen for IA M1A1 tank depot maintenance. Nor was the status of the M1A1 hydraulic fabrication/test equipment resolved.

USF-I comments to 15.a.(3) were responsive and no further action is required.

15.b. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq, coordinate with the U.S. logistics advisors at Taji National Depot, the Joint Base Workshop Commander, and with the Ministry of Defense to determine and make arrangements for any additional training necessary for Iraqi Army personnel to be able to effectively operate Joint Base Workshop equipment.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation. USF-I (J4), in conjunction with the Strategic Logistics Directorate and Army Materiel Command and approved by Commander, Joint Base Workshop, have developed and implemented a train-the-trainer concept for the Wheel Depot to build a foundational capability.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, forward to the OIG the Program of Instruction for the train-the-trainer program at the JBW Wheel Depot.

## **Observation 16. The Iraqi Asset Management Program and On-Hand Inventory of Repair Parts at the Medium Workshops**

The Iraqi Asset Management Program (IAMP) database did not accurately reflect on-hand inventory of repair parts at the Medium Workshops and failed to provide accurate visibility to the Joint Repair Parts Command (JRPC), the JHQ, and the MoD, due to a lack of training on using the IAMP and a distrust of automation, in general. There was also a general reluctance to allow external organizations insight into what repair parts were on hand at the Medium Workshops.

Failure to adequately manage the on-hand inventory of repair parts across the IA maintenance system can result in increased spending by buying parts that may already be on hand, increased warehousing costs, and possible loss, if excess parts must be stored outside. Furthermore, such mismanagement will ultimately result in a further decrease in the operational readiness of critical IA vehicles and systems.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

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**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the former Iraq Assistance Group

logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

### **American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010**

**Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

### ***The Iraqi Asset Management Program***

The Medium Workshops (3<sup>rd</sup> line maintenance) were connected to the JRPC at Taji (4<sup>th</sup> line maintenance) over the internet-based IAMP program. The Field Workshops (2nd line maintenance) provided data to the Medium Workshops by compact disc. Although the Iraqis chose IAMP as the solution to repair parts and vehicle maintenance management in the IA, they were not yet confident in the system. They had not entered all on-hand repair parts and status of vehicles into the system and did not understand exactly how the system worked. For example, when they ordered a part in IAMP, it went to the JRPC. If the JRPC had it in stock, the part was made available for the Medium Workshop to pickup. However, if the part was not available at JRPC, the IAMP program would return the request to the Medium Workshop, where it must be acted on within 7 days through local purchase or IAMP essentially put it in the dead box. Iraqi operators at some of the Medium Workshops did not understand that aspect of IAMP and failed to follow through on local purchases. Consequently, they thought their order just disappeared from the system.

Although the implementation of IAMP across the IA demonstrates progress from just two years ago, the system is only as good as the data entered into it. With help from U.S. trainers, progress was being made at the JRPC in that regard. However, the Medium Workshops had not all entered their inventory of repair parts into IAMP, despite direction from logistics officials at the JHQ to do so.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

16. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq coordinate with the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters Director of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering for a Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters team to verify on-hand repair parts inventory at the Medium Base Workshops and to enter inventory data into the Iraqi Asset Management Program.
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### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, provide the OIG with details of the actions taken to verify the repair parts inventory at the Medium Base Workshops and to enter inventory data into IAMP.





## **Observation 17. Location Commands—Al Asad and Numaniyah**

Location Commands (LCs) at Al Asad and Numaniyah were not being effectively utilized. The Al Asad LC was fully built-out and manned, but was still not operational since there were no supplies, including fuel, stored there. The warehouses were nearly empty. The Numaniyah LC was fully operational and manned. The warehouses had the appropriate categories of supplies and the fuel farm had fuel. However, the Numaniyah LC rarely received requests for supplies from the 8<sup>th</sup> IA Division, the unit it supported.

According to interviews with U.S. advisors and IA personnel, the supported army divisions often sought and received support from Taji (in some cases over 100 miles away), rather than from their supporting LC, which was often on the same installation as the division headquarters or within the same area.

That condition was most likely caused by the highly centralized organization of the IA and its logistics support system, which mitigated against unity of effort between and among operational line units and supporting logistics depots. In addition, the LCs and IA divisions resided within two separate chains of command, which served to impede coordination and cooperation in an effort to address and solve logistics problems.

Those inefficiencies contributed to decreased supply system responsiveness and decreased logistics readiness for the operational IA divisions.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides transition teams and organizations partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done.

**Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ), “DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009.** Chapter 6 describes the mission and function of the Directorate of EME and the processes and procedures for maintenance in the Iraqi Armed Services. Chapter 8—Iraqi Logistics Operations Center (ILOC) (DRAFT). The ILOC serves as a Strategic Level Logistics Operations Center for the collection and distribution of logistics information from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Iraqi Air

Force, Iraqi Naval Command and relevant Operational Centers, and provides viable analysis to the JHQ in order to assist the decision-making process.

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the former Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

**American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

### ***Location Commands and IA Divisions—Supporting and Supported***

The LCs were organized to provide logistics support to specifically assigned IA divisions, but were not under the control of those divisions. The LCs reported to the DCOS LOG at the MoD Joint Headquarters, and the IA divisions were under Iraqi Ground Forces Command.

Any request for support from the division went up the chain of command to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, over to DCOS LOG, then to Taji, and eventually back down to the LC. That process was cumbersome and time-consuming. In most instances, the issuance of supplies to the requesting division took place directly from Taji, and the request was never sent to the LC responsible for providing its support and where the requested supplies might already be on-hand. Consequently, LCs had not developed a strong supporting/supported link with their respective IA divisions.

Some division commanders seemed satisfied to receive their supplies directly from Taji. From the commander’s perspective, that process cut out a step in the supply process, although it could lead to non-doctrinal stockpiling of supplies in the division area that was not prepared to store and account for large quantities of supplies. Consequently, there was no outcry from the supported division commander when the LC warehouses and fuel farm were empty, because the division did not routinely rely on the LC for its supplies. That situation discouraged the implementation of the doctrinal functioning of the IA logistics system, in general, and undermined the development of the role of the LCs, specifically.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

17. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq:

a. Coordinate with and mentor the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to bring the Al Asad Location Command to operational status and determine the way ahead for increased utilization of the Numaniyah Location Command, as well as other Location Commands.

b. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to overcome Iraqi Army division reluctance to use assigned Location Commands for their resupply.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, provide the OIG with details of the actions to be taken in order to bring the Al Asad Location Command to operational status and to increase utilization of other Location Commands.



## **Observation 18. Logistics Support of Iraqi Army Divisions**

The MoD Joint Headquarters DCOS LOG provided an equal level of logistics support across all IA divisions, which did not appear consistent in all cases with operational needs. For example, the 7<sup>th</sup> IA Division area of operation (AO) was 160,000 square kilometers--the largest AO of any IA division--yet it received the same allocation of fuel and other logistics support as a division that was guarding part of Baghdad, with an AO of approximately 100 square kilometers.

That determination was caused by a failure by MoD and JHQ to allocate logistics resources to IA divisions based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). (Although METT-TC is a U.S. Army doctrinal concept, it is applicable to this situation.)

That allocation inequity hampered the mission capability of IA divisions with larger and/or more active AOs. In the case of the 7th IA Division, it could not adequately carry out its mission to secure Al Anbar province because the fuel allocation was insufficient to operate division vehicles for the whole month.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.**

This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides transition teams and organizations partnered with Iraqi forces with a baseline reference on processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done.

**Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ), “DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009.** Chapter 6 describes the mission and function of the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and the processes and procedures for maintenance in the Iraqi Armed Services. Chapter 8—Iraqi Logistics Operations Center (ILOC) (DRAFT). The ILOC serves as a Strategic Level Logistics Operations Center for the collection and distribution of logistics information from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Naval Command and relevant Operational Centers, and provides viable analysis to the JHQ in order to assist the decision-making process.

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by the former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the former Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

**American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

### ***The Basis for Logistics Support***

The MoD Joint Headquarters DCOS Log reportedly allocated logistics support equally across all IA divisions, without considering METT-TC. Such an analysis applied to logistics support would invariably lead to different levels of support by division, often by class of supply, depending on the uniqueness of each division’s AO. Conversely, a failure to consider METT-TC in the allocation of logistics resources could well lead to operational mission constraints and possibly mission failure.

The 7<sup>th</sup> IA Division, with a 400 x 400 kilometer AO in Al Anbar, reported the following specific issues:

- The allocation of 20 liters of fuel per day, per vehicle—the same as other IA divisions—resulted in a reduced operational tempo that was insufficient to meet mission requirements. They requested a 200 percent increase in their fuel allocation, but had not yet received a response at the time of our visit.
- There was an insufficient supply of repair parts to maintain the required operational tempo of critical equipment. Their HMMWV operational readiness rate was reportedly less than 50 percent, forcing them to keep their HMMWVs in reserve and only use them for emergencies, increasing the risk to both personnel and mission accomplishment.

If IA divisions are to meet the minimum essential capability of providing internal security and foundational external security, the allocation of scarce logistics resources must be made on the basis of METT-TC, rather than being divided up equally.

### **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

18. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq mentor senior logistics planners in the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters to apply an analysis of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support, time available, and civil considerations in determining the amount of logistics support each Iraqi Army division requires.

***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, provide the OIG with an update of the logistics support analysis based on METT-TC conducted by senior logistics planners in the MoD and JHQ, once completed.





## **Part IV – Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Organizations**

This section contains a series of observations and recommendations concerning the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Police Organizations, including the Federal Police, the Department of Border Enforcement, and Provincial/District Police. The Oil Police and Facility Protection Police were not directly observed but were covered at the strategic and operational level with logistics-focused interviews and briefings at the Iraqi MoI.



## **Observation 19. Repair Parts for the Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Vehicle Fleet**

MoI could not effectively plan and contract to procure repair parts to support the Iraqi police vehicle fleet. Although MoI had matured in its planning, budgeting, and tracking strategies and processes, MoI lagged in effective procurement execution.

That situation occurred because, collectively, MoI senior staff was still developing the capability to identify repair parts requirements and subsequently source and contract to fill those requirements.

Without a supply of critical repair parts to sustain maintenance of tactical and non-tactical vehicles and enabling equipment associated for those vehicles, such as radios and turret-mounted automatic weapons, operational ready rates of the MoI vehicle fleet will continue to decline.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Army Field Manual 3-07, “Stability Operations,” October 2008.** This manual is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. It presents the overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals.

**Army Field Manual 3-07.1, “Security Force Assistance,” May 2009.** This manual is the Army’s doctrinal publication for security force assistance. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance, focusing on brigade combat teams conducting security force assistance and advising foreign security forces.

### ***Budget Background***

MoI operated on a requirements-based budget system. Budget formulation was a four month process that began with an internal ministry requirements-planning conference and ended with the Director of Finance proposing the budget to the Minister of the Interior. MoI has improved its budget execution over the past few years. Ministry data, deemed reliable by our advisory staff, indicated that budget execution had improved from 84.5 percent in 2007 to 90.6 percent in 2009.

According to historical background provided by the MoI Director of Planning and Tracking, in 2008, in coordination with the Director of Finance, he got the budget preparation process for the procurement of logistics support to be linked to operational requirements, planning, budget execution, and contracting. That process was further refined in 2009 by:

- Developing a multi-year Strategic Plan for 2010 through 2012,

- Completing an operational plan,
- Linking budgeting and planning to requirements generation,
- Conducting training on how to build operational plans, and
- Developing logistics requirements.

MoI still needed to improve its requirements generation process to better enable the planning, budgeting, and procurement process, according to U.S. advisors and MoI personnel. A senior MoI official highlighted his successes in developing a Strategic Plan and getting the budget linked to operational plans at the General Districts of Police and regional police headquarters. However, he stated that the program still had weaknesses because some units were not submitting legitimate requirements tied to operational plans, but rather lists of items they simply wanted.

ITAM-MoI advisors stated that MoI had submitted a requirement for the purchase of a \$200 million helicopter fleet and the justification consisted of only eight bulleted lines and did not address spare parts, maintenance support, or required infrastructure. Another submission request was for a street camera system (similar to U.S. traffic speed cameras), pen surveillance cameras, and other clandestine devices.

We noted the difficulty in translating requirements received from the 21 police headquarters across Iraq. For example, the regional police headquarters needed wiper blades for its large trucks but it did not know how to identify the correct specifications or forecast future requirements for each make and model of the “large truck” fleet.

In February 2010, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure, in coordination with the Director for Maintenance conducted an analysis of required repair parts. They created a demand analysis based on the manufacturer’s preventative maintenance standards and created a list of tools, repair parts, and training requirements to conduct that maintenance. The Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure had also organized a study group on requirements intended to institutionalize the process and foster a culture of related learning.

### ***Establishing Supply Chains***

The MoI was working to establish national-level vehicle parts supply chains. Once those supply chains are established, in principle, the Iraqi police forces will be able to order parts directly from the newly established supply sources. For example, MoI identified up to 20 repair parts providers for the Ford F-350. In addition, senior MoI logistics managers stated that the ministry was committed to reducing the number of makes and models in its fleet to 16, an objective that was supported by A&T advisors. Supply chains would be established for all 16 models in order to ensure long-term sustainment. At the time of our visit, MoI was supplying its critical spare parts from FMS cases provided under ISFF that came with 2-years of parts support.

MoI had recently purchased a U.S. FMS case consisting of equipment, installation, training, and technical support for a system designed to indicate availability of parts by

vehicle make and model and track them to vehicle identification numbers for accountability, which would also serve as an automated supply chain management system for MoI. That system will come with information technology support at the 21 regional headquarters that communicate with MoI via the internet and provide visibility of parts usage and history that can be used to generate future requirements.

### ***Developing Contracts***

MoI had approximately 50 assigned Iraqi contracting personnel, 20 assigned to MoI headquarters and 30 spread out among the 15 provinces. MoI had awarded direct contracts and processed FMS cases awarded by U.S. program offices.

According to two senior ITAM-MoI contract advisors, acquisition training provided by MoI to its cadre of contracting personnel was of insufficient or poor quality. Most of the training was conducted via computer-based instruction at the MoI contracting site where there was limited computer access. That situation adversely impacted the incentive of contracting personnel to train and learn.

An ITAM-MoI police advisor stated that the single most important logistics issue needing to be addressed was the inability of the system to provide critical parts on a sustainable basis beyond what was provided through ISFF or FMS cases, which corresponded to the ministry's difficulty in developing requirements and getting them documented in a usable format for translation into contractual language. In 2009, the MoI was largely unsuccessful in contracting directly for their recurring vehicle parts needs.

### ***Conclusion***

The MoI lags in procurement and execution of its budget because it lacks sufficient capability to identify and document requirements to enable its contracting department to procure needed parts and supplies at a level that would sustain the operational readiness of its vehicle fleet. A new FMS case will provide contracted support for developing supply requirements and establishing supply chains for the police vehicle fleet and other items on the MoI table of allowances. The requirements group formed by MoI will also help on an interim basis, at least, by pushing down parts from MoI to the regional maintenance facilities until the capability provided by the FMS case can create demand histories. In order for that system to be effective, MoI must provide its personnel with training in the areas of developing requirements and contracting support.

### **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

<p>19. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq assist the Ministry of Interior to plan for, develop, and invest in an organic training program to provide planning, programming, budgeting, execution, finance, logistics, and supply training to senior Ministry of Interior leaders, police, and administrators.</p>
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***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation, noting that even though Key Leader Engagements already cover the importance of planning and budgeting for maintenance requirements, further emphasis is being applied on developing functional PPBE.

***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive; no additional comments are required.

## Observation 20. The Federal Police Sustainment Brigade

The Federal Police (FP) are a key security force in the national security strategy of Iraq. In order for FP to effectively conduct anti-insurgent and anti-terrorist operations, it needs sustainable logistics support from the Federal Police Sustainment Brigade (FPSB), which is not well developed. All U.S. Advise and Train trainers/mentors assigned to the FPSB were expected to redeploy by June 30, 2010, before FPSB minimum essential capabilities for logistics sustainment had been reached.

There were no plans to backfill many of the Logistics Training Advisory Teams (LTATs), to include the FPSB LTAT, which were included in the continuing drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq.

Loss of the LTAT will negatively impact FPSB development with respect to establishing an enduring logistics sustainment capability within the FP. FPSB operational effectiveness will likely be reduced as a result of the loss of its LTAT, and a key component of the GoI's national security strategy will be impaired.



Figure 1. Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Transition Team  
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

**American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF



Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics, concepts, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

**U.S. Forces–Iraq Fragmentary Order 10-01.3 to U.S. Forces–Iraq OPORD 10-01, Transition to Stability Operations (U).** This is a classified document.

**U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” January 2009.** This document examines the theory and principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency, the components of an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and interagency counterinsurgency assessment, planning and implementation. The DOD and U.S. military forces provide a broad range of capabilities to support an integrated U.S. counterinsurgency effort. These may include advising and training foreign military and logistics support.

**“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” Report to Congress, March 2010.** This quarterly report to Congress includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as directed by legislation. This report complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its former Coalition partners, or Iraq.

**Army Field Manual 3-07, “Stability Operations,” October 2008.** This manual is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. It presents the overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals.

**Army Field Manual 3-07.1, “Security Force Assistance,” May 2009.** This manual is the Army’s doctrinal publication for security force assistance. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance, focusing on brigade combat teams conducting security force assistance and advising foreign security forces.

**Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),” April 30, 2004.** This publication establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense operations. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

**Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Standard Operating Procedures, January 2010.** The purpose of this MoI document is to prescribe common procedures, processes, and standards for the logistics management development of the Federal Police Sustainment Brigade.

### ***The Federal Police and the Federal Police Sustainment Brigade***

The IA was the initial, and at times, sole Iraqi security force employed against insurgents and terrorists within Iraq. However, the police forces have increasingly played an important role in that mission, and as the level of violence decreases and Coalition Forces redeploy, the FP are expected to assume an even greater responsibility for internal security. The related security development process and its outcome has been designated “Police Primacy.”<sup>2</sup> Key among the internal security capabilities necessary for achieving Police Primacy is an effective FP force.

The FP was established by MoI Memorandum No. 4012 on June 2, 2004, and has developed into a national security organization that bridges the gap between the IA and local police forces. It is capable of conducting specific paramilitary operations in the provincial areas of the country against insurgents and terrorists.

A critical mission enabler for the FP in the execution of its mission is the FPSB. The FPSB was established in 2007 and is considered by FP leadership to be one of its finest achievements, despite being under development. The FPSB provided tactical and operational logistics support for four FP divisions across Iraq, and for a fifth that was in development.

At the time of our visit, the FPSB was manned at only 25 percent of its planned end-strength, which included:

- Headquarters
- Maintenance Battalion
- Logistics Battalion
- Transportation Battalion
- Medical Battalion

The FP planned to sustain the operational force capability by providing a sustainment battalion to each Division. Each sustainment battalion was to be organized, manned, and equipped by its parent Division, without additional resourcing. At the time of our visit, only the 2nd Division had an operational sustainment battalion.

The FPSB was scheduled to receive a \$47 million permanent home base at Salman Pak. That expansion was considered necessary with the pending arrival of significant FMS and ISFF-purchased equipment that would eventually support five divisions.

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<sup>2</sup> 2010 Joint Campaign Plan for the Development of Iraqi Security Forces, Cover Letter, November 2009.

According to U.S. advisors and senior FPSB officers, despite the organizational, policy, and infrastructure improvements and establishing the FPSB, there was insufficient time for U.S. forces to train, model, and partner with the FP to establish effective logistics capacity at all levels. “Development of sustainment capabilities for local security forces is essential to establishing a viable local security structure.”<sup>3</sup> Effective logistics capability also requires developing a culture of sustainment, requiring additional time and partnering beyond the completion of the equipping and training mission. Ultimately, without the ability to sustain operations with supplies, fuel, and repair parts, the FPSB and FP will not achieve the MEC in logistics.

Although the FPSB needed more training and partnering to achieve MEC, it will, in fact, receive less with the reduced U.S. advisory effort after June 30, 2010. The reason the FPSB will not continue to receive U.S. training assistance is simply because it was designated a “Brigade” rather than a “Division.” That decision appears to have been a bureaucratic oversight for determining whether the FP needs continuing logistics advisory support from A&T.

Coalition Forces should continue to provide appropriate logistics assistance until FPSB MEC is achieved or the USF-I end of mission. Assistance should include partnering with the FPSB to establish divisional logistics units in accordance with U.S. doctrine that addresses partnering and establishing an enduring logistics capability.<sup>4</sup>

## **Conclusion**

U.S. doctrine, plans, and experience in Iraq and other stability or contingency operations point to the importance of developing a sustainable logistics system for the ISF, including the police forces. A major component of the Iraqi security strategy to combat terrorism and the insurgency is the FP. Logistics sustainment of the FP is centered on the logistics support capability of the FPSB. However, the FPSB lacked adequate force structure, infrastructure, training, expertise, and experience to execute its mission. A&T must have the mission, capability, and support in order to assist the FPSB’s continued development.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

20. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq, in coordination with the Deputy Commanding General for Support, United States Forces-Iraq, reassess the requirements for continued advisory support to the Federal Police Sustainment Brigade through the end of mission in December 2011, and either provide the support using internal personnel resources, or seek external assistance, as appropriate.

### **Client Comments**

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

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<sup>3</sup> CALL Handbook, No. 10-08, Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities, p. i, November 2009.

<sup>4</sup> CALL Handbook, No. 10-08, Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities, p. 22, November 2009.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, provide the OIG with details of the actions taken to reassess the requirements for continued advisory support to the FPSB through the end of mission in December 2011.



## **Observation 21. Munitions Safety Issue at the Federal Police Headquarters Storage Facility**

Munitions at the FP Headquarters storage facility were improperly stored, creating a safety hazard for both FP and U.S. personnel.

The FP facility contained a supply of Chinese-produced 82mm mortar rounds, stacked high and not separated by barriers that are normally used to mitigate propagation in the event of an abnormal environmental incident, such as fire or rocket attack, which could trigger an explosion. Some of the 82mm rounds appeared to be white phosphorous-filled munitions, a category of munitions that must be stored separately from other munitions due to its sensitivity. However, the type of round stored in the munitions containers were not identified on the outside of the container. In addition, some of the presumed white phosphorous rounds were stored horizontally, rather than vertically, which could lead to degradation over time and present additional safety issues.

This occurred because neither FP personnel nor U.S. advisors were aware of proper bulk or sensitive ammunition storage requirements.

Improper storage of that type of ammunition close to FP and U.S. personnel could result in injury, loss of life, and the destruction of the ammunition and the storage facility.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**DOD 6055.09-STD, “DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards,” February 29, 2008.** DOD Explosive Safety Standards state that white phosphorous has a compatibility code of H and is incompatible for storage with other munitions, with the exception of compatibility code S associated with small arms ammunition.

**Technical Manual 9-1300-250, “Ammunition Maintenance,” September 25, 1969.** This manual provides general information and guidance for the maintenance of conventional ammunition, to include its demilitarization. It requires that the following information must be stenciled legibly on each box of ammunition:

- Nomenclature
- National stock number,
- Department of Defense Identification Code,
- Lot number, the date of manufacture, and
- Quantity.

If any of those markings are hard to read, they must be touched up with paint. If the markings are illegible, the box must be opened to check the markings on the inner containers.

### ***Munitions Storage at the Federal Police Headquarters***

The FP developed warehouse and munitions storage facilities at their Baghdad headquarters. An onsite visit of those facilities indicated remarkable improvement of the

warehouses, including storage procedures. The munitions facility was well maintained, with good accountability of on-hand inventory, distribution, and storage locations. However, there seemed to be a lack of knowledge about proper storage procedures for more hazardous munitions, such as Chinese 82mm mortars, which have specific storage requirements in order to prevent explosive propagation in the case of fire, accident, or even attack on the facility.

A U.S. MoI advisor pointed out that the mortars were purchased by the GoI from the Chinese government and that half of the buy reportedly included white phosphorous-filled mortar rounds. The 82mm mortar round crates were stacked higher than the allowable standard of four feet. U.S. military procedures also would have required those mortar rounds to be stored in a nose up orientation. More importantly, however, they were not stored in a separate facility, which is also a standard U.S. military requirement, due to the safety incompatibility with high explosive rounds.

In a subsequent meeting, the MoI Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure stated that a memorandum had been sent from MoI to the Prime Minister concerning the storage of 82mm mortars and ammunition at FP headquarters, requesting permission to transfer the ammunitions to MoD control. His position was that those munitions should not be used by the FP for operations in urban areas, given that their mission was to avoid unintentional collateral damage or loss of life. However, he did state that MoI intended to keep its stock of rocket propelled grenades and 18 of the 82mm mortars for emergency operations outside of city limits.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

21. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq advise the Ministry of Interior on an appropriate storage policy for munitions; these requirements should be conveyed to all police services.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with this recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the proposed MoI munitions storage policy once completed.

## **Observation 22. The Federal Police Medical Battalion—Medical Supplies**

According to FP commanders, the last time the FP Medical Battalion (FPMB) received medical supplies from the Ministry of Health, the established GoI organization for providing that support, was February 2009. Since then, either Coalition Forces had been providing the necessary medical supplies or the supplies were purchased in the local market by FP medical personnel.

This occurred because MoI had not paid the Ministry of Health for medical supplies and the Ministry of Health did not recognize the credentials of the FPMB medical staff for justifying the receipt of those supplies. This issue reflected an apparent ongoing disagreement between the two ministries and their respective roles and responsibilities.

If the issue is not resolved, the FP will not be able to obtain medical support from within the established logistics system, leaving them dependent on ad hoc and unreliable local purchases of medicine and other necessary supplies. That situation could put the health of FP personnel at risk and could also indicate a systemic fault line in GoI logistics support for the police.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Army Field Manual 3-07.1, “Security Force Assistance,” May 2009.** This manual is the Army’s doctrinal publication for security force assistance. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance, focusing on brigade combat teams conducting security force assistance and advising foreign security forces.

**Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),” April 30, 2004.** This publication establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense operations. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

**Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Standard Operating Procedures, January 2010.** The purpose of this Iraqi document prescribes common procedures, forms, and standards for the logistics management processes of the FPSB.

### ***Medical Support for Federal Police Operations***

The FP was established by MoI Memorandum No. 4012 on June 2, 2004, and has developed into an organization that bridges the gap between the IA and local police forces by conducting specific paramilitary operations in the provincial areas against insurgents and terrorists.



Since it was formed, the FP has sustained 7,100 casualties (over 1,000 annually), including, 2,600 killed in action and 4,500 wounded in action, and continues to suffer high casualties in ongoing security operations. The FP conducted 10 major counter-terrorist operations since 2005, many in remote locations where medical treatment facilities were not available. Because it operates in remote areas, FP do not have ready access to civilian medical facilities or medical supplies.

According to FPSB Standard Operating Procedures FP commanders must provide at a minimum, adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, evacuation, and preventive medicine to support operations in austere locations.<sup>5</sup>

The FBMB is a critical mission enabler for the FP. It is the primary provider of Level I medical treatment, which includes sick call and preventive and emergency medicine. The FPMB evacuates patients when it cannot provide the treatment required. The FPMB also provides Level 2 medical treatment including:

- Dental care,
- Laboratory support,
- X-ray support, and
- Limited patient hold capacity.

The total number of medical personnel that supported 45,000 FP across four divisions, its headquarters, and the FPSB were:

- 4 physicians,
- 1 dentist,
- 1 pharmacist,
- 1 nurse, and
- 248 medics.

Requests for medical supplies were normally filled at the lowest level, and unfulfilled requests continued up the chain of command until filled. However, advisors stated that no Class VIII medical supplies had been received since February 2009, which caused medical personnel to purchase medical supplies using their own money, unit funds, or special funding requests submitted through FP headquarters. Figure 2 illustrates with solid arrows the doctrinal method for obtaining medical supplies. The dashed arrows show the reliance on the local market at various levels.

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<sup>5</sup> U.S. Joint Publication 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)," April 30, 2004, p. V-32.




Figure 2. FPSB Medical Logistics

According to U.S. doctrine, plans, and experience, forces that operate in areas without access to adequate medical care must be able to provide their own. The FP were often required to operate in such conditions. However, the medical supply system in support of the FPMB has been inoperative since February 2009, and MoI had no apparent plan to correct that deficiency.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

22. Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq:

a. Coordinate with the Ministry of Interior to develop a plan for medical logistics support of the Federal Police Medical Battalion.

b. Seek appropriate support from the U.S. Mission to resolve the apparent impasse between the Ministry and Health and the Ministry of Interior over their respective responsibility so that medical support will be provided to the Federal Police.

### ***Client Comments***

USF-I concurred with these recommendations.

### ***Our Response***

USF-I comments were responsive. We request that DCG, A&T, USF-I, forward to the OIG a copy of the proposed plan for medical logistics support for the FPMB, once completed and an update on resolution of MoH/MoI impasse regarding medical support.



# Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from August 2009 to August 2010 in accordance with the standards published in the *Quality Standards for Inspections*. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. Site visits in Iraq were conducted from April 23, 2010 to May 7, 2010.

We reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, DOD directives and instructions, and appropriate USCENTCOM and USF-I guidance.

The purpose of our assessment in Iraq was to determine whether the plans, training, preparations, and designated missions of USF-I A&T, the U.S. advisory and assistance brigades, and sustainment brigades to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the Iraq Security Forces are synchronized with in-country plans and operational assumptions and needs.

We visited or contacted organizations in the U.S. and Iraq that are responsible for planning and implementing the train, advise, and assist mission for the ISF. We reviewed the processes involved in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the ISF and spoke with U.S. and Iraqi leaders and managers at all levels, ranging from general officers, to staff officers, to training and mentor team members in the field.

The ISF logistics sustainment assessment chronology was as follows:

August 2009 – April 2010	Research and fieldwork in CONUS
April 23, 2010 to May 6, 2010	Fieldwork in Iraq
May 7, 2010	Outbrief to USF-I A&T
May – July 2010	Analysis and report writing
August 2010	Draft report issued
September 2010	Management comments received and evaluated

## Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

## Use of Technical Assistance

We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

## Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

A&T	Advising and Training
AAB	Advise and Assist Brigade
ACSA	Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement
AO	Area of Operation
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DCOS LOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
EME	Electrical and Mechanical Engineering
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FP	Federal Police
FPMB	Federal Police Medical Battalion
FPSB	Federal Police Sustainment Brigade
GoI	Government of Iraq
HMMWV	High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
HVSI	High Value Sustainment Initiatives
IA	Iraqi Army
IAMP	Iraqi Asset Management Program
ILOC	Iraqi Logistics Operations Center
ISF	Iraq Security Forces
ISFF	Iraq Security Forces Fund
ITAM	Iraq Training Assistance Mission
JBW	Joint Base Workshop
JHQ	Joint Headquarters
JRPC	Joint Repair Parts Command
LC	Location Command
LMAT	Logistics Military Advisory Team
LMI	Logistics Management Institute
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LTAT	Logistics Training Advisory Team
MEC	Minimum Essential Capability
METT-TC	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and Support available-Time available and Civil considerations
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoI	Ministry of Interior
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
RFF	Request for Forces
SES	Senior Executive Service
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USETTI	U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq
USF-I	U.S. Forces – Iraq
USFORSCOM	U.S. Forces Command

## Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last four years, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General have issued a number of reports discussing either (1) the accountability and control over munitions and other equipment provided to the ISF, or (2) the development of ISF logistics capability.

Unrestricted SIGIR reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.sigir.mil>.

Unrestricted DODIG reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports> or at <http://www.dodig.mil/spo/reports>

Some of the prior coverage we used in preparing this report included:

### Congressionally Initiated Reports

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2010.

“The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” September 2007.

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraq Security Forces,” July 2007.

### GAO

GAO-09-476T, “Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in U.S. Strategies,” March 2009.

GAO-08-568T, “Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability Over U.S. Efforts and Investments,” March 2008.

GAO-08-153, “Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq’s Budget Execution,” January 2008.

GAO-08-143R, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraq Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed,” November 2007.

GAO-08-117, “U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risks,” October 2007.

GAO-07-1195, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,” September 2007.

GAO-07-711, “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraq Security Forces,” July 2007.

GAO-07-637T, “Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management Challenges of Iraq’s Security Ministries,” March 2007.

GAO-07-582T, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraq Security Forces’ Logistical Capabilities,” March 2007.

GAO-07-503R, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraq Security Forces’ Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, March 2007.

GAO-07-444, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning,” March 2007.

GAO-07-120C, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraq Security Forces’ Support Capabilities, March 2007.

GAO-07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” January 2007.

## **Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**

SIGIR-10-008, “Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program,” January 25, 2010.

SIGIR-09-027, “Developing a Depot Maintenance Capability at Taji Hampered by Numerous Problems,” July 30, 2009.

SIGIR-09-014, “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” April 26, 2009.

SIGIR-06-033, “Iraq Security Forces: Weapons Provided By the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” October 2006.

SIGIR -06-032, “Iraq Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, October 2006.

## **Department of Defense Inspector General**

DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-003, “Assessment of the Accountability of Night Vision Devices Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” March 17, 2009.

DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-002, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces,” December 19, 2008.

DODIG Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008.

DODIG Report No. D-2008-026, “Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia - Phase III,” November 2007.

DODIG Report No. IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” July 2005 (the Department of State Office of Inspector General participated in this assessment and issued Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72).





## Appendix C. Glossary

This appendix provides definitions of terms used in this report.

**Accountability** – DOD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, states that accountability is the obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or funds, with or without physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public interest. However, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an organization or person.

**Foreign Military Sales Program** – The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is that part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal agreements between the U.S. Government and an authorized foreign purchaser or international organization.

Those agreements, called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), are signed by both the U.S. Government and the purchasing government or international organization. The LOA provides for the sale of defense articles and/or defense services (to include training) usually from DOD stocks or through procurements under DOD-managed contracts. As with all security assistance, the FMS program supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

DOD Financial Management Regulation Volume 15, Definitions, April 2002 (current as of July 17, 2008), defines a FMS case as a U.S. DOD LOA and associated supporting and executing documents.

**Foreign Military Sales Pseudo Cases** – According to personnel at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the pseudo LOA or case is used by the U.S. Government to track the sale of defense articles and/or services (to include training and design and construction services) and are generally funded by a U.S. Government entity (for example, the U.S. Government DOD funding provided to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund is used to fund pseudo FMS cases for Afghanistan).

The pseudo LOA itemizes the defense articles and services included in the Letter of Request. However, the pseudo LOA is not signed by the foreign purchaser or international organization receiving the articles and/or services. The pseudo LOA is authorized by public law and the Arms Export Control Act.

**High Value Sustainment Initiative** – HVSIs focus synchronized energy and resources intended to influence multiple levels and elements of the logistics and fiscal processes in order to achieve key strategic outcomes and broad, enduring effects.

**Joint Manning Document** – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01C, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” January 1, 2004 (current as May 1, 2006) states that a manning document of unfunded temporary duty positions constructed for or by a supported combatant commander that identifies the specific individual augmentation positions to support an organization during contingency operations.

Joint manning documents (JMDs) for permanent activities with a joint table of distribution or joint table of mobilization distribution should only identify individual augmentation positions for temporary military or DOD personnel.

JMDs for activities without a joint table of distribution (JTD) or joint table of mobilization distribution (JTMD) (e.g., some joint task forces) should identify all positions required for that activity to support the mission. Positions should be identified as unit fill, ISAF/Coalition fill, civilian/contractor fill, or individual augmentation fills on the JMD.

**Logistics** – Joint Publication 1-02 states that logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
- movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services.

### **Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction**

– DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, defines military support to SSTR as DOD activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

**Minimum Essential Capability-Logistics** – The logistics and industrial capability in order to attain and sustain minimum materiel readiness levels for the ISF.

**Minimum Essential Capability-Overall** – The capability of the Iraqi security ministries, institutions, and forces to provide for Iraq’s internal security and to develop the foundation for defense against external threats no later than 31 December 2011.

**Security** – Joint Publication 1-02 defines security as a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from unintentional or directly hostile acts or influences. For the purpose of the Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Strategic Plan, security entails visibility over and physically keeping AA&E in the custody of only those with specific authorization, and the ability to quickly identify and respond to situations or incidents of actual or potential compromise of AA&E while in the logistics chain.

**Security Assistance Organizations** – DOD Directive 5132.13, “Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel,” January 9, 2009, defines security cooperation organizations as all DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation/assistance functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel.

**Stability Operations** – DOD Directive 3000.05 defines stability operations as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.



# Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S. and Iraqi organizations:

## United States

### *Department of State*

- U.S. Embassy Political/Military Counselor

### *Department of Defense*

#### **U.S. Forces Command**

- Commander/key staff, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, Ft. Stewart, GA
- Commander/key staff, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, Ft. Stewart, GA
- Commander/key staff, 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, Ft. Benning, GA
- Key staff members, 162d Infantry Training Brigade, Ft. Polk, LA

#### **U.S. Central Command**

- Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, U.S. Forces-Iraq and key staff members
- USF-I Strategic Logistics Planning Directorate
- ITAM-MoD
- USF-I Advise and Train Political Advisor
- ITAM-Army
- ITAM-Air Force
- ITAM-Navy
- Advisors--Abu Ghraib Warehouse/Baghdad International Air Port
- Partnership Strategy Group – Iraq
- 1/82 Advise and Assist Brigade
- 307th Brigade Support Battalion
- USMC Military Training Team, Iraqi Army 7th Div Headquarters
- 1/3 Advise and Assist Brigade
- 3rd Brigade Support Battalion

- Security Assistance Office/Iraq Security Assistance Mission
- ITAM- MoI
- ITAM-Police
- Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Advisors

### **Defense Agencies**

- Officials assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency

## **Government of Iraq**

### ***Ministry of Defense***

- Vice Chief of Staff, MoD Joint Headquarters
- Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
- Ministry of Defense Integrated Logistics Operations Center
- Director, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering
- Al Asad Location Command
- Numaniyah Location Command
- Taji Location Command
- Taji Joint Base Workshop
- Taji Joint Repair Parts Command
- Taji General Depot Command
- Iraqi Army General Transportation Regiment
- Iraqi Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineering School
- Iraqi Army Admin School
- Senior Logistics Manager – Iraqi Army M1A1 Tank Program
- 7th Iraqi Army Division
- 17th Iraqi Army Division

### ***Ministry of Interior***

- Federal Police HQ and Sustainment Brigade
- Director of Planning and Tracking
- Ministry of Interior Finance
- Ministry of Interior Information Center
- Ministry of Interior Infrastructure

- Ministry of Interior Central Maintenance Facility
- Baghdad Police College Warehouses and Armament Repair Facility
- Department of Border Enforcement Headquarters
- Department of Border Enforcement 3<sup>rd</sup> Regional Maintenance Facility
- Baghdad Provincial District of Police
- Directorate and Maintenance Facility
- Baghdad Provincial Police Headquarters





# Appendix G. Client Comments

## Commander, U.S. Forces – Iraq Comments



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

UNITED STATES FORCES – IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09342-1400

USF-I DCG (A&T)

16 October 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD IG, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0286.000)

1. We appreciated the recent DoD IG assessment of our efforts to develop the logistical sustainment capability of the Iraq Security Forces. We conducted a thorough review of the draft assessment and have included in the enclosure the actions or planned actions taken by USF-I (DCG (A&T) and J4 Forward) to accomplish the recommendations.
2. If you have any questions, please contact LTC John Gallagher, DSN 318-239-5803 or email [john.m.gallagher@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:john.m.gallagher@iraq.centcom.mil).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. Schoenbeck", is written over a horizontal line.

THOMAS J. SCHOENBECK  
SES, US Army  
Executive Director

**DODIG Draft Report Review “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop  
the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces”  
(Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0286.000)**

**USF-I COMMENTS TO THE REPORT**

**RECOMMENDATION 1. (Page 11 of Draft)**

1. a-d. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs

**RECOMMENDATION 2. (Page 15 of Draft)**

2. a. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs and is continuing to work this action.
2. b. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs. Support of this recommendation is identified in the USF-I transition plan of programs, projects, activities and tasks currently being conducted by United States Forces –Iraq (USF-I). These specific activities will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy - Baghdad, and the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I), as the senior military advisor to the US Ambassador. The members of the logistics section will be fully qualified, and have the mission to support the continued development of the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) logistical capabilities to support the ISF force structure.

**RECOMMENDATION 3. (Page 18 of Draft)**

3. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs

**RECOMMENDATION 4. (Page 21 of Draft)**

- 4.a-b **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs

**RECOMMENDATION 5.b. (Page 27 of Draft)**

5. b.1 **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs. Even though Key Leader Engagements (KLE) already cover the importance of planning and budgeting maintenance requirements, further emphasis is being applied. A recent example is a meeting between Mr. Johns, SES, Director of Strat Log and MG Abdulameer, Deputy Minister of Interior. During this KLE, the two flag officers and several military advisors discussed the criticality of proper planning and budgeting for maintenance and additional areas of interest such as ammunition storage, warehouse operations and power generation. MG Abdulameer seemed very cognizant of the issue and agreed completely with the need for planning and budgeting. Additionally, emphasis was and is being placed during KLEs on execution of the budget as actual spending is much less than MOD and MOI authorized budgets.



5. b. 2 **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs and is continuing to conduct KLEs with emphasis on developing functional PPBE.

**RECOMMENDATION 6. (Page 31 of Draft)**

6. a. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs with the information provided in this report. USF-I J4 (Forward) in conjunction with STRATLOG and the Ministry of Defense is designing a concept of maintenance sustainment where M1114 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) made available through the U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) initiative are incorporated as part of a one-for-one exchange capability. Units assigned to the Ministry of Defense would deliver non-mission capable (NMC) M1114s that are beyond third-line repair capability to the Joint Base Workshop (JBW) Wheel Depot at Taji. These units would be issued fully mission capable (FMC) M1114s in exchange for these vehicles. In concept the NMC vehicles would be dropped from unit accountability records and the FMC vehicles would be added to unit accountability records during the course of this one-to-one exchange. The NMC M1114s would enter the JBW Wheel depot for fourth-line overhaul as the existing production schedule permits.

Due to the FY2010 Congressional Notification for USETTI Section 1234 transfer authority approval and expiration on 30 September 2010, we currently have no authority to transfer M1114s to the Iraqi Security Forces. This situation currently precludes the use of USETTI to provide an appropriate number of vehicles to alleviate the 4<sup>th</sup> Level Maintenance downtime. Based on information from the OSD-DSCA, the earliest we can expect FY2011 authority is upon approval of the FY2011 NDAA in the early part of 2011. As a result, USF-I ITAM STRATLOG ICW USF-I J4 briefed the Iraqi Army Electrical, Mechanical and Engineering Director on proposal to use a small number of M1114s from internal sources as maintenance feeder vehicles or "Operational Readiness Float" program. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, is currently staffing and debating the proposal.

6. b. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 7. (Page 34 of Draft)**

7.. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs and will explore available options to ensure tour lengths are proper.

**RECOMMENDATION 8. (Page 36 of Draft)** **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF concurs with these recommendations; manpower analysis is ongoing to ensure we maintain the right number and right mix of personnel through each phase of the transition and post transition.



#### **RECOMMENDATION 9. (Page 39 of Draft)**

9.a **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF Concur. Support of this recommendation is identified in the USF-I transition plan of programs, projects, activities and tasks currently being conducted by United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I). These specific activities will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy - Baghdad, and the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) as the senior military advisor to the US Ambassador. The members of the logistics section will be fully qualified, and have the mission to support the continued development of the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) logistical capabilities to support the ISF force structure. Additionally, they will coordinate with all U.S. interagency offices to ensure proper support to U.S. led or involved activities concerning building partner capacity (in all areas supporting the ISF). Specific answers/data needed are addressed in OSC-I Supporting Plan on FRAGO 10-01.4 (Stability Ops)(Secret/NOFORN) .

9.b **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs with the information provided in this report. In conjunction with the development of OPORD 11-01, a working group was established to define the requirements for oversight of equipment and materiel provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) United States Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) should it extend beyond end of mission in December 2011. Due to legislative set-backs with the Section 1234 (non-excess) equipment Congressional Notification (CN), the process continues to be evaluated and refined to ensure delays do not adversely impact minimum essential capability (MEC). In addition, mitigation strategies are currently in the development stages; these strategies allow the services to define and assess courses of action to reduce any negative impacts on the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) should the equipment not be available for transfer.

9.c **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs. Support of this recommendation is identified in the USF-I transition plan of programs, projects, activities and tasks currently being conducted by United States Forces –Iraq (USF-I). These specific activities will be transferred to the U.S. Embassy - Baghdad, and the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) as the senior military advisor to the US Ambassador. The members of the logistics section will be fully, qualified and have the mission to support the continued development of the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) logistical capabilities to support the ISF force structure. Specific answers/data needed are addressed in OSC-I Supporting Plan on FRAGO 10-01.4 (Stability Ops)(Secret/NOFORN) .

#### **RECOMMENDATION 10. (Page 44 of Draft)**

10. **USF-I RESPONSE:** Recommend changing United States Forces Command to US Army Forces Command. USF-I concurs

#### **RECOMMENDATION 11.a., (Page 49 of Draft)**

11.a **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.



**RECOMMENDATION 12.. (Page 53 of Draft)**

12.a-12.b **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 13.. (Page 56 of Draft)**

13. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 14.. (page 58 of Draft)**

14. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 15.. (Page 61 of Draft)**

15. a. (1) **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I partially concurs with the information provided in this report. The U.S. Government (USG) identified existing deficiencies that were preventing the full commissioning of the Small Arms Repair Facility (SARF). The Joint Base Workshop (JBW) conducted a comprehensive assessment of the SARF's existing facility, equipment, and infrastructure at the request of the USG. This assessment identified multiple deficiencies requiring corrective action in order to bring the SARF to a fully functional Level Four (4) maintenance facility by the USG's target date of 31 December 2010. The SARF is intended to overhaul, rebuild, modify, inspect, and repair a wide range of small arms and crew served weapons.

One of the major issues hampering successful completion of the contract has been the quality of the renovation and construction work under the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) Phase III contract. Due to delays caused by changing priorities, incomplete COE infrastructure modifications and unrealized requirements for installed equipment; additional work is needed to bring the facility to initial operating capacity IAW Statement of Work (SOW) paragraph 9.2.18.

To that end, delivery order 0034 will be modified to complete electrical repairs, equipment installation and commissioning efforts to bring the SARF up to a fully functional Level Four Maintenance facility. The contracting officer has determined that the SARF modifications are within the scope of the contract. A full proposal is expected NLT 13 OCT 10. Tier 1 repairs and training are projected to be complete by 31 DEC 10; this will establish a foundational capability for the SARF.

15. a. (2) and (3) **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs with information provided in this report. All payments related to Customs have been paid by the current contractor resulting in the delivery of equipment needed to complete installation at the Joint Base Workshop (JBW).

15. b. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs with information provided in this report. USF-I J4 (Forward) in conjunction with Strategic Logistics (Stratlog) and Army Materiel

Command (AMC) and approved by Commander, Joint Base Workshop, have developed and implemented a train-the-trainer concept for the Wheel Depot. The premise of the training plan is to build a foundational capability. Key points include the following: 1) Train cadre of ISF soldiers to develop self-sufficiency as well as a future training capability. Mechanics will be trained on M1114, M923, and 20 specialized shops (stations). 2) Training time is based on a five hour day, five days per week, on a two week on, one week off cycle to accommodate ISF requirements. 3) The pace of the training is geared to the ability of the cadre class. AMC will certify ability/performance for each station and task and provide written confirmation to JBW leadership. 4) USF-I J4 (Forward) will conduct regularly scheduled training inspections to garner QA/QC oversight. 5) AMC will develop a similar plan for the Small Arms Repair Facility and for Depot Production Management Training. 6) Stratlog will work with Electrical-Mechanical Engineering (EME) Directorate in organizing and automating JBW CL IX warehouses on the IAMP system that will eventually link to Joint Repair Parts Command (JRPC). 7) Training for the Track Depot is dependent on the Gol/ISF desires for future capability.

**RECOMMENDATION 16., (Page 64 of Draft)**

16. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 17., (Page 67 of Draft)**

17.a and 17.b **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 18., (Page 71 of Draft)**

18. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 19., (Page 77 of Draft)**

19. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs – see response to 5.b. above.

**RECOMMENDATION 20., (Page 82 of Draft)**

20. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 21., (Page 84 of Draft)**

21. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

**RECOMMENDATION 22., (Page 87 of Draft)**

22. **USF-I RESPONSE:** USF-I concurs.

### **GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT**

USF-I concurs with the DOD IG recommendations and will continue to work these issues to a satisfactory resolution.

APPROVED BY:  
<<Original Signed>>  
Brian Cummings  
COL, USA  
Chief of Staff

PREPARED BY:  
<<Original Signed>>  
Anthony J. Ruzicka  
LTC, USA  
Deputy, ISF Strat Log



# Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments



LOGISTICS AND  
MATERIEL READINESS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500

OCT 21 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL PLANS AND  
OPERATIONS, DoDIG

THROUGH: DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION RESOURCES AND ANALYSIS *WS 10/22/10*

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Draft Report on Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to  
Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces  
(Report No. D2009-D00SPO-0286.00)

As requested, I am providing responses to the general content and recommendations  
contained in the subject report.


**Recommendation [5.a]:**

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with  
the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United States Forces-Iraq,  
provide deployed assistance for a minimum of 180 days to help develop a functional  
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process within the Ministry of Defense  
and to mentor and train appropriate Iraqi Personnel on the use of those processes.

**Response:**

Non-Concur. Although USD (AT&L) does have a Senior Executive Service member  
working in Iraq with the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, United  
States Forces-Iraq, we do not agree that this become an enduring mission for USD (AT&L),  
but rather that this requirement be programmed in the staffing support requests of USF-I and  
later migrate to the Office of Security Cooperation under the Chief of Mission.

Please contact Mr. Kevin Doxey at 703-693-1685 or by e-mail at  
[kevin.doxey@osd.mil](mailto:kevin.doxey@osd.mil) if additional information is required.

  
Alan F. Estevez  
Principal Deputy

# **Appendix E. Iraq/U.S. Policy, United States Code, United States Forces-Iraq/Advise and Train Policies**

## **Part I – Policy and Plans**

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), January 28, 2008.** Section 1228 of the Act sets forth the requirements for the tracking and monitoring of defense articles provided to the Government of Iraq.

**U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” January 2009.** This document examines the theory and principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency, the components of an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and interagency counterinsurgency assessment, planning and implementation. The DOD and U.S. military forces provide a broad range of capabilities to support an integrated U.S. counterinsurgency effort. These may include advising and training foreign military and logistics support.

**Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force,” January 19, 2007.** This document establishes tour length policy for various DOD military components.

**Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters (JHQ), “DCOS LOG Materiel Circulation Processes,” October 1, 2009.** Chapter 6 describes the mission and function of the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and the processes and procedures for maintenance in the Iraqi Armed Services. Chapter 8–Iraqi Logistics Operations Center (ILOC) (DRAFT). The ILOC serves as a Strategic Level Logistics Operations Center for the collection and distribution of logistics information from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Naval Command and relevant Operational Centers, and provides viable analysis to the JHQ in order to assist the decision-making process.

**Federal Police Sustainment Brigade Standard Operating Procedures, January 2010.** The purpose of this Iraqi document prescribes common procedures, forms, and standards for the logistics management processes of the Federal Police Sustainment Brigade (FPSB).

## **Part II – United States Code and Hearings**

**Public Laws.** Congress appropriated \$18.2 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and \$25.5 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund in Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, 111-32, 111-118. These Public Laws defined the “train and equip” mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specify that the funds be used in support of the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Title 10 USC 168, (10 U.S.C. 168), amended on February 10, 1996.** The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities designed to encourage a democratic orientation of the military forces of other countries. To carry out the program, Title 10 states that funds appropriated and made available for carrying out the authorized activities may be used for, among other things, U.S. activities and expenses for military liaisons and traveling contact teams as well as for seminars and conferences held in the theater of operations.

**22 U.S.C. § 2403: U.S. Code--Section 2403: Definitions.** Defines "Defense article" in subsection (d) (3) to include, among other things:

Any machinery, facility, tool, materiel supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection.

## **Part III – DOD Policies**

**Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, “DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” January 23, 2009.** This document establishes the policy through which an appropriately sized subset of the DOD civilian workforce is pre-identified to be organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that facilitates the use of their capabilities for operational requirements. These requirements are typically away from the normal work locations of DOD civilians, or in situations where other civilians may be evacuated to assist military forces where the use of DOD civilians is appropriate.

**DOD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training”. September 3, 2004.** This directive states that:

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations...

The DOD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.

**DOD Directive 5132.13, “Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel,” January 9, 2009.** This directive establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities for the selection and training of personnel to serve in security cooperation/assistance positions.

**DOD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training,” January 13, 2009.** This directive states that:

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations...

The Heads of the DOD Components shall Ensure, through commanders and managers at all levels within their Components, that the personnel and organizations under their cognizance are qualified to perform their Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to established competency and proficiency standards.

**DOD Directive 2010.9, “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,” April 28, 2003.** The directive updates policy for the acquisition from and transfer to authorized foreign governments logistics support, supplies, and services.

**DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.** This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations. This guidance will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned aid in further development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

**DOD Instruction 4140.66, “Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles,” October 15, 2009.** This document establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and sets forth procedures in accordance with section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 to certify the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export and/or transfer of defense articles to specified countries and/or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of those countries.

**DOD Instruction 5000.64 “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006.** This DOD instruction states that:

- Provides policy and procedures for DOD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with Section 524, Titel 40, U.S.C.
- Requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DOD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

**DOD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” January 4, 2006.** This DOD instruction states that management internal control procedures are basic to U.S. Government accountability and are specified in this instruction. It also identifies operational and administrative controls for Security Assistance Management of Foreign Military Sales.

**DOD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003.** This manual provides guidance for the administration and implementation of Security Assistance<sup>6</sup> and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives. It states that:

[T]itles to FMS materiel normally transfers from the USG [U.S. Government] to the purchaser immediately upon its release from a DOD supply activity<sup>7</sup> (point of origin). However, USG security responsibility does not cease until the recipient Government’s or international organization’s Designated Government Representative (DRG) assumes final control of the consignment.

[T]he maximum processing time between Implementing Agency receipt of the Letter of Request and release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance should normally be no more than 120 days, with no adjustments for hold times, additional work needed to clarify requirements, or any other consideration. Although delays may occur while processing some LOAs [Letter of Offer and Acceptance], Implementing Agencies should process at least 80 percent of their total number of LOAs within 120 days.

**DOD 6055.09-STD, “DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards,” February 29, 2008.** DOD Explosive Safety Standards state that white phosphorous has a compatibility code of H and is incompatible for storage with other munitions, with the exception of compatibility code S associated with small arms ammunition.

**Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),” April 2004.** This publication establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense operations. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” January 1, 2004.** This instruction provides guidance for assigning individual augmentation, to meet the combatant commanders’ and other government agencies temporary duty requirements supporting the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense directed or approved operations.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2120.01A, “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,” November 27, 2006.** This instruction provides policy and procedural guidance concerning the use of the legal ACSA authorities contained in Sections 2341-2350 of title 10, United States Code. This guidance is directed to the combatant commands (including USCENTCOM) and Defense

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<sup>6</sup> Security Assistance is defined in Appendix C.

<sup>7</sup> DOD 5105.38-M states a supply activity can be either a DOD storage depot or a commercial vendor that furnishes materiel under a DOD-administered contract.

agencies reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also summarizes the responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Military Departments.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” September 29, 2006.** This manual sets forth planning policies, processes, and procedures to govern the joint operation planning and execution activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander(s) and other joint force commanders in development of selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Enclosure (R) of the manual describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing a Request for Forces or Request for Capabilities message.

**Army Field Manual 3-07, “Stability Operations,” October 2008.** This manual is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. It presents the overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals.

**Army Field Manual 3-07.1, “Security Force Assistance,” May 2009.** This manual is the Army’s doctrinal publication for security force assistance. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance, focusing on brigade combat teams conducting security force assistance and advising foreign security forces.

**U.S. Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24), December 2006/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5, “Counterinsurgency,” December, 15, 2006.** This document establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

**Technical Manual 9-1300-250, “Ammunition Maintenance,” 25 September 1969.** This manual provides general information and guidance for the maintenance of conventional ammunition, to include its demilitarization.

**USCENTCOM Request for Forces Serial 1018 (Classified).** This document requests forces to support mentoring and partnering of Government of Iraq ministries.

**USFORSCOM Message: Subject/2008 Revised Transition Team Training Guidance, March 2008.** This message provides updated training guidance for transition teams deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This document replaces IAG training guidance DTG 182148Z Jan 07 and aligns previous guidance for transition teams deploying to Southwest Asia with FORSCOM training

guidance for follow on forces deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This message directs that all transition team personnel are to conduct pre-deployment training in accordance with this message.

**USFORSCOM Message: Subject/Specified Training Requirements for Advisory Teams and In Lieu of (ILO) Elements, January 2010.** This message describes modifications to task organization and training for deploying brigades providing advisory teams, transition teams (TT), and provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) resulting from the recent shift in emphasis on the security force assistance mission in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**USFORSCOM Message: Subject/FORSCOM Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-On Forces Deploying in Support of Southwest Asia (SWA), May 2010.** This message provides a stand-alone document which does not require referencing prior messages and incorporates requirements and procedures identified in Headquarters, Department of the Army Execution Order 150-08, Subject: “Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy.” It is used to guide development of the unified and collaborative reserve component pre-deployment training plans.

**Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook was developed by former Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the former Iraq Assistance Group logistics staffs to present partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “How the Iraqi Army Operates (Edition 3),” September 2009.** This document provides U.S. military transition teams and units partnered with Iraqi forces a baseline reference to processes and procedures integral to the Iraqi Army. It attempts to connect “theory” to “practice” by providing a means by which transition teams and partner units can differentiate between how things are supposed to be done and how they are being done. The book does not address procedures internal to the transition teams, partner units, and their chains of command.

**American Embassy–Baghdad and Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009.** Appendix 1 to Annex J, ISF Logistics–Transition to Self-Sustaining Capability contains the logistics concept, conditions, and objectives of the Security Line of Operation and directs tasks that must be accomplished for the ISF to become self sustaining. As the Line of Operations contributor, USF-I J4 is responsible for ensuring that these tasks remain relevant as conditions change.

**U.S. Forces–Iraq Fragmentary Order 10-01.3 to U.S. Forces–Iraq OPORD 10-01, Transition to Stability Operations (U).** This is a classified document.

**Advise and Train Joint Manning Document.** This document authorizes the unfunded temporary duty positions for A&T while in support of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

**United States Forces-Iraq, (Advise and Train), Minimum Essential Capabilities Assessment, April 2010.** This document contains the DCG A&T's assessment of current and projected status of certain minimum essential capabilities for the ISF.

**MNSTC-I FRAGO 09-047, [Formation of Iraqi Security Forces Strategic Logistics Directorate (ISF STRAT LOG)], DTG 281800C SEP 09.** This FRAGO established the ISF Strategic Logistics Directorate as the single unifying strategic logistics organization reporting directly to the MNSTC-I Commanding General (now DCG A&T).

**ITAM-Logistics, “Ministry of Interior Advisor Logistics Handbook (2010 Edition),” November 23, 2009.** This document provides a “How To” guide in the areas of supply, maintenance, and fuel for the MoI.





# Appendix F. Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

July 15, 2010

## MEMORANDUM FOR Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

SUBJECT: FY 2010 and FY 2011 Budget Requests for the Iraq Security Forces Fund

The recently completed fieldwork on the "Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces" (Project No. D2009-D000SPO-0286.000) revealed a time-sensitive issue regarding financial resource support requested by our military command in Iraq (USF-I). This memorandum provides information for management consideration and potential action. Management comments to this memorandum are optional.

On February 19, 2010, the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) announced an assessment mission which was conducted by its Office of Special Plans and Operations to determine whether:

- The planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. forces to train, advise, and equip the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) in its development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability were effective.
- Plans, training, preparations, and designated missions of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) Advise and Train forces, U.S. advisory and assistance brigades, and sustainment brigades assigned to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring ISF logistics sustainment capability were synchronized with in-country plans, operational assumptions, and needs.

The OIG assessment team engaged in extensive data analysis prior to departure and, while deployed in Iraq, interviewed senior and mid-level U.S. military commanders and staff, State Department officers, embedded U.S. trainers/advisory personnel and their Iraqi counterparts, officials in the Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI), as well as the Iraqi Joint Headquarters senior military staff. In addition, the team also visited U.S. logistics trainers/mentors and their Iraqi counterparts at the Baghdad Police College, MoD and MoI logistics depots/hubs, U.S. and Iraqi Army divisions and brigades, Iraqi Federal and Border Police forces and their U.S. advisors.

### **Background:**

A sustainable ISF operational capability, including an enduring logistical sustainment capability is a key U.S. objective in Iraq that supports the U.S. forces' end of mission in December 2011. To achieve this campaign objective the DOD requested \$3 billion for the ISFF in the FY 2010 Supplemental and FY 2011 budget request.

If the ISF logistical system is insufficiently developed by U.S. forces' end of mission, ISF operational capability to provide internal and external security will be negatively impacted. In addition, ISF capacity to sustainably maintain the operating condition of ISF equipment and infrastructure previously financed by ISFF or that has recently been purchased using ISFF funding could be significantly impaired, leading to untimely degradation of an extensive investment in U.S.-supplied materiel.

### **Discussion:**

Building the capability of the ISF to maintain the internal security of Iraq and provide a foundational external defensive capability is the priority goal of USF-I "train and equip" efforts. This requires development of a viable Iraqi MoD and MoI logistics system that can attain and sustain the support required to maintain ISF operational readiness. Although progress has been made in this respect, there are still significant challenges remaining. With the ISFF resources requested, in the months remaining before U.S. forces depart Iraq, USF-I intends to tackle key ISF logistics system shortcomings on an expedited basis. But, it will need the ISFF funding requested to accomplish this mission.

The U.S. government has so far primarily invested in basic training, equipment, and supplies necessary to generate Iraq army combat units and stand-up Iraqi police forces. However, USF-I training, advising, and equipping priority emphasis has now shifted to building essential combat enablers, including ISF logistical capability. The ISFF funding requested will be invested in those still under-developed ISF logistics and other enabling force capabilities necessary to enable and sustain future Iraqi security force operations. In addition, USF-I plans to facilitate training the ISF needs in order to be able to account for, control, and maintain equipment the U.S. has already funded and provided, and materiel still in the U.S. supply pipeline, as well as defense materiel the GoI will purchase itself.

### **Critical Logistics Shortfalls**

The Government of Iraq, with DOD and USF-I assistance, will need to rapidly build an effective ISF logistics sustainment capability if the ISF expects to have and support a relatively modern and effective Army and Police. Iraqi government fiscal support for building this logistics capability has been generally insufficient. This can be attributed, in

part, to a seeming lack of GoI awareness of the importance of logistics sustainment. Moreover, the MoD and MoI have not yet adequately matured their respective planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes. Consequently, they have not demonstrated the ability to effectively present and justify their funding requests.

Among the outstanding MoD logistics weaknesses USF-I plans to address are:

- Insufficient planning, programming, budgeting, and execution capacity to use Government of Iraq provided funding,
- Inadequate ability to establish repair parts and maintenance requirements for transport and combat vehicles and to procure/contract for them, and
- Ineffective supply system processes and procedures to adequately support the operational needs of the respective Iraqi military and police services.

Although MoI logistics system capacity is considered somewhat more effective than that of MoD, MoI still has areas of significant weakness. For example:

- Inadequate senior and mid-grade logistics management skills,
- Insufficiently trained mechanics, investigators, and counter-explosives teams,
- Under developed supply chain processes and procedures, and
- Inability to procure sufficient repair parts.

In the months remaining, senior U.S. advisors to MoI, MoD, and to the military Joint Headquarters intend to intensively concentrate on assisting the ISF to build its capacity to determine spare parts requirements, develop and execute logistics related contracts, ensure necessary vehicular maintenance, and perform other primary logistics functions. At present, the MoD, MoI, and the Army and police units they support, do not have a supply system capable of maintaining operational readiness of the ISF.

#### ISFF Programming Supporting Development of an ISF Logistics Capability

ISFF 6 and 7 program justifications include funding to address some of the critical weaknesses noted above. Notable among them are:

- Developing MoD resource management, budgeting, procurement and acquisition, contracting, and logistics support systems,

- Implementing a national automated maintenance program (Iraqi Asset Management Program) to manage ammunition and supply depots,
- Completing a National Tracked Maintenance Depot and a National Engineering Maintenance Depot for the MoD,
- Establishing a Supply Chain Management System for the MoI and all branches of the Iraqi police, and
- Fixed and rotary wing sustainment support.


With the ISFF funds requested in FY 2010 and FY 2011, USF-I plans to concentrate its advisory focus on training and equipment necessary to establish the basic ISF logistics capability. The additional ISFF monies also will be used by USF-I to prevent degradation of equipment previously supplied, or to be supplied, using ISFF resources.

### Conclusion

The USG, and therefore USF-I, has limited influence over the planning and programming decisions made by the sovereign Government of Iraq with respect to MoD and MoI funding. The transitional status of the Iraqi government and uncertainty as to when the next government will even have an annual budget in place further compounds Iraqi budgeting uncertainty, and therefore, that of MoD and MoI funding.

On the other hand, ISFF resources can be targeted to address specific, critically necessary ISF training and equipping needs, and they could be provided to decisively advance development of key ISF logistics sustainment functions, while U.S. forces are in position to do so. If USF-I expects to achieve its priority objective of developing an enduring ISF logistical sustainment capacity by U.S. forces' end of mission, it will need to expeditiously receive and apply the ISFF support it has requested.

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of DOD personnel during the conduct of this assessment. The team would be pleased to discuss this observation and preliminary recommendation with you at your convenience. The project team leader is Special Plans and Operations Division Chief, Stanley E. Meyer, who can be reached at: 703-604-9130, DSN: 664-9130, [Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil) or [Stanley.Meyer@dodig.smil.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.smil.mil).

  
Ambassador Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
for Special Plans and Operations





# Inspector General Department of Defense